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This dissertation explores the impact of private capital flows on South Africa’s 
developmental state agenda in the post-apartheid era. South Africa is one country that 
has set, beforehand, the objective to become a developmental state. However, the 
role of private capital flows as a factor that can determine the success, or the failure 
of that objective is largely missing from the debate about constructing the 
developmental state in South Africa. By exploring the impact of private capital flows, 
the study seeks to inform the reader about the nature and composition of private 
capital flows in South Africa as well as investigate whether these flows hinder or 
accelerate South Africa’s developmental state objective. 
The study has utilized qualitative methods. It also made use of quantitative data as a 
secondary supplement to ensure a greater understanding of the research problem. In 
addition, the study has used the theory of financialization from Marxist Political 
Economy which posits that private capital flows are unproductive and merely 
interested in surplus accumulation without producing anything substantive in the long 
term. 
The research findings indicate that financial liberalization as a step that was taken by 
the democratic government to attract private capital flows has not been beneficial for 
South Africa’s long term development as it allows capital flight and illicit financial flows. 
While South Africa did manage to attract private capital flows after liberalizing its 
capital account, these flows have been made up mainly of portfolio investments that 
do not contribute significantly to the productive sectors. Instead, portfolio investments 
drive excessive household debt, consumption and financial speculation. Moreover, 
private capital flows reinforce a non-developmental agenda by exacerbating the 
problem of unemployment, inequality, and poverty which are key developmental goals 
that South Africa seek to overcome through the developmental state. More 
importantly, South Africa’s reliance on private capital flows constrain its economic 
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Chapter 1  
Private Capital Flows and the Challenges of Development in a New Democracy 
1.1 Brief Background 
In 1994, the new democratic government inherited a battered economy that had been 
in decline for the past three decades. The country had just suffered a five-year 
recession and its GDP had been on the decline for the past 30 years (Tsikata, 1994:3). 
As the apartheid state declined in capacity from the 1980s, unemployment, inequality 
and poverty worsened for the marginalized people in the country (Lipton and Simkins, 
1993:5). As a result, the new democratic government had a task to set the South 
African economy on the growth path that will induce inclusive development. The new 
ruling elite came with Reconstruction & Development Plan (RDP), a socio-economic 
policy framework that set out to transform the highly racialized economy and ensure 
inclusive development for the people of South Africa. From RDP as the first coherent 
policy framework under the new democratic government to latest policy framework – 
NDP, the triple challenges of unemployment, inequality, and poverty have been the 
hallmark of South Africa’s developmental agenda.1 This developmental agenda has 
been largely framed around the country’s aspiration to be a developmental state. It is 
stated in the NDP that “in a society with deep social and economic divisions, neither 
social nor economic transformation is possible without a capable and developmental 
state” (NPC, 2012:407). The inspiration to build a developmental state in South Africa 
emanates from the East Asian developmental states that had achieved rapid growth, 
industrialization, and inclusive development in the 1970s (Chu, 2016:1). The African 
National Congress (ANC), and subsequently the South African government, embraced 
the idea of the developmental state due to structural-developmental challenges such 
as stagnant economic growth, poor-performing industries, unemployment, worsening 
inequality, and widespread poverty in the country (Qobo, 2007).  
                                                             
1 While there other development objective that South Africa pursue, the study has limited the reference of 
developmental agenda to the triple challenge of unemployment, inequality and poverty.  
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To overcome these structural challenges, the ANC government decided that the state 
must play a central role in channeling domestic and international resources to 
productive sectors.2 White and Wade (1988:1) define a developmental state as one 
whose notion of development is less spontaneous but rather “it is more subject to 
teleological determination with the state playing the role of historical animateur”. White 
and Wade’s definition of developmental states elucidates the role of the state as one 
that determines the developmental trajectory as opposed to market forces in a bid to 
positively transform society. In this regard, the state achieves its objective through a 
well-coordinated economic policy that does not displace the market but rather guides 
the market rationality in the long term for sustainability (Chu, 2016:1). The 
developmental state, as an economic model, presented an opportunity for the South 
African government to overcome the structural challenges in the country.  
However, South Africa’s objective to become a developmental state is set in a global 
era whereby the global economy is underpinned by neoliberal ideology.3 It is an era 
whereby finance has been liberalized as many countries abolished capital controls4. 
Bello et al (2000:3) posit that prior to financial liberalization wave across the globe, 
capital flows were limited as they were tightly controlled. 5 This was during the Bretton 
Woods era which began from 1945 to mid-1970s in which there was state-managed 
modus-operandi in the domestic and global economy (Bello et al, 2000:5). In the 
literature, this period is often referred to as a Keynesian economy or state-assisted 
capitalism. When the neoliberal ideology gained dominance in the 1980s, developing 
countries were encouraged to liberalize their capital accounts. There was a strong and 
consistent claim from the orthodox economists that liberalization of capital accounts 
and the acceptance of overall liberal international regime was good for developing 
countries because it promoted development (White and Wade, 1988:5). While other 
countries willingly liberalized their capital accounts and allowed the free movement of 
                                                             
2 It is important to note that the ANC has been the ruling party since 1994 and thus has dominated South 
Africa’s economic policy direction. 
3 Neoliberalism refers to a set of political beliefs which indicate that sole legitimate purpose of the state is to 
safeguard the individual freedom and property rights. In this context, the state ought to have minimal role in 
the economy and any intervention beyond its sole purpose would be classified as unacceptable (Thorsen and 
Lie, 2006:14).  
4 Capital controls refer to taxes or any restrictions on the free movement of international capital (Neely, 
1999:13)  
5 According to World Bank (2019), capital flows refer to cross-border financial flows that are comprised of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI). Therefore, in this study, a reference to 
private capital flows includes both FDI and FPI.  
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capital, those who did not do it themselves were forced to do so by the international 
organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) (White and Wade, 1988:5). As a 
result of widespread financial liberalization, finance overtook trade and became the 
driver of the global economy. Currently, Reuters (2019) report that the volume of 
foreign exchange transactions that are traded per day amount to US$ 5.1 trillion, 
thereby making it the biggest market in the world.  
South Africa is one of the developing countries that adopted a neoliberal economic 
framework and proceeded to liberalize their financial account. In 1995, the new 
democratic government abolished the Financial Rand and dual exchange rate system 
which served as a mechanism to control capital flows (Liebenberg, 1995). The new 
democratically elected government made a case that the continuity of the capital 
controls was going to inhibit the new foreign investment (Liebenberg, 1995). This line 
of argument gives a glimpse of the extent to which the neoliberal ideas had penetrated 
the new ruling elites at the time. It is worth noting that the liberalization of capital first 
began during the RDP and then further liberalization happened under the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), adopted in 1996 (Mosala and Bain, 2017). 
GEAR was the beacon of neoliberal ideology.6 There are two primary reasons for 
ANC’s policy position and overall acceptance of neoliberalism. Firstly, when the ANC 
came to power, it wanted to be accepted by the international community. Secondly, 
the ANC government believed that private capital inflows will assist the country to build 
its infrastructure, create employment and bring economic prosperity (Kondlo, 2015).7 
In other words, the ANC believed that the removal of capital controls would attract 
private capital inflows which would serve as a vehicle for inclusive development in 
South Africa. Indeed, after the liberalization of the capital account, there has been an 
influx of capital inflows into the country.  South African Reserve Bank (SARB) quarterly 
reports indicate that total private capital inflows increased from US$ 5.2 billion in 1994 
to US$280 billion in 2018 (SARB,2018). Whilst this is a significant amount of foreign 
investment, the orthodox economists’ claim that private capital flows promote 
development is yet to be proven true by the empirical evidence in South Africa. The 
country still struggles with the problem of unemployment that is sitting at a staggering 
                                                             
6 GEAR’s neoliberal stance will be fully discussed in subsequent chapters. 
7 All capital flows referred to in the study pertains to private capital flows.  
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27.9 per cent using only the official definition, ballooning inequality, and widespread 
poverty (StatsSA; 2019).  
1.2 Problem Statement  
South African ruling elites built the economic foundations of the new democratic state 
on the neoliberal ideology. This was done with the primary aim of attracting private 
capital to assist with the state’s developmental agenda. However, this has not resulted 
in overcoming the salient structural problems of the country such as unemployment, 
inequality and poverty. When the government recognized the failure of the unfettered 
market and neoliberalism, it sought to reintroduce a stronger role of the state through 
the developmental state model. However, the primary problem is that South Africa 
seeks to be a developmental state while private capital flows remain unregulated. So 
far in its plan to be a developmental state, the government has not devised 
mechanisms that will guide private capital flows.  
Previous studies on developmental state have focused on the internal contradictions 
in the country that prevent the emergence of an effective developmental state 
including corruption and lack of capacity in the bureaucracy. However, exogenous 
factor such as private capital flows play a decisive role in the development of a country 
and therefore, can determine the success of a developmental state. Scholars have 
argued that private capital flows have effectively put an end to the East Asian 
development state during the financial crisis of 1997-1998(Pang, 2000). However, the 
role of private capital as the success determinant of South Africa’s developmental 
state is conspicuously missing from the debate about constructing developmental 
state in the country.  
1.3 Aims and Significance of the Study  
The primary aim of the study is to understand the impact of private capital flows in the 
realization of South Africa’s developmental agenda within the developmental state 
context. The study has two objectives and the first one is to understand the 
composition and nature of private capital in South Africa. The second objective is to 
understand whether private capital flows accelerate or hinder South Africa’s 
developmental state agenda. 
‘Attracting foreign investment to promote growth and development’ has become a daily 
mantra for South African officials and policymakers. However, South African 
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policymakers battle with the difficulty of balancing the international and domestic 
pressure to achieve sustainable growth while seeking to build the capacity to be a 
developmental state. This study seeks to add to the debate on the construction of the 
developmental state in the globalized and financialized era by focusing exclusively on 
private capital flows, its nature and the impact it has on development. South Africa has 
a priori set the objective to become a developmental state with the aim to emulate the 
rapid growth achieved by East Asian countries. However, time and context are 
different. By exploring the role of private capital, the study also seeks to inform the 
policymakers of the recent developments in global capital which they can use to design 
better policy mechanism to insulate the country from undesired developmental 
consequences.  
1.4 Research Questions  
The study seeks to answer the following question;  
 What is the impact of private capital flows in the realization of South Africa’s 
developmental state agenda in the post-apartheid era? 
The study will also answer the following sub-questions;  
 What is the nature and composition of private capital flows in South Africa in 
the post-apartheid era?  
 Do private capital flows hinder or accelerate South Africa’s developmental state 
agenda in the post-apartheid era?  
1.5  Conceptual Framework 
1.5.1 Private Capital Flows 
Capital flows refer to cross-border financial flows that are recorded in other countries’ 
financial accounts (IMF, 2014:3). The term private denotes that the financial flows 
emanate from non-government entities but rather from private institutions and 
individuals. Private capital flows are composed of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI). According to OECD (2008:16), FDI refers to cross 
border investments a direct investor makes to another country with the purpose of 
having a long-term relationship with a direct investment enterprise. The long-term 
relationship indicates that the direct investor will have a significant influence on the 
management of the direct investment enterprise. For a foreign investor to establish 
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this long-term relationship with the enterprise, the investor needs to own at least 10 
per cent of the voting shares (OECD, 2008:17). OECD (2008:17) indicates that direct 
investment enterprises are essentially corporations that can be in the form of 
subsidiaries, associates or branches. The share ownership varies depending on the 
type of corporation. For instance, with the case of a subsidiary, the direct investor gets 
50 per cent of the voting power; in the case of associates, the direct investor holds 10 
per cent to 50 per cent of the voting shares; and in the case of a branch, the parent 
company owns 100 per cent of the voting share (OECD, 2008:17) 
On the contrary, with FPI, the investor does not seek to influence the management of 
the enterprise.8 According to UNCTAD (1999:4), FPI includes "…investments by a 
resident entity in one country in the equity and debt securities of an enterprise resident 
in another country which seeks primarily capital gains and do not necessarily reflect a 
significant and lasting interest in the enterprise". Foreign portfolio investments include 
bonds, shares mutual funds, and financial derivatives (UNCTAD, 1994:4). Moreover, 
there is a mixture of local and international factors that are considered to be paramount 
in attracting private capital flows.  
1.5.2 Determinants of Private Capital Flows 
Other parts of the literature, particularly the econometrics scholarship, has focused on 
the determinants of private capital flows. This is one of the important aspects of the 
literature because it has policy implications. Policymakers focus on attracting foreign 
investment to supplement their domestic savings. In most cases, they would focus on 
factors that influence private capital inflows and aim to align their policies following 
those factors. Within the literature, six broad factors attract private capital inflow 
namely;  
 
A. Macroeconomic performance  
Economic growth is an important factor that attracts private capital flows. Iamsiraroj 
and Doucouliagos (2015) state that there is a positive correlation between 
economic growth and FDI inflows. Ahmed, Arezki and Funke (2005) indicate that 
a rapidly growing economy is more likely to generate high future returns. High 
                                                             
8 In this study, foreign portfolio investment will be referred to portfolio investments for easy reference.  
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returns attract most of the portfolio investments. Overall, high macroeconomic 
performance serves as a factor that attracts private capital flows. 
 
B. Quality of institutions  
Institutional quality is another important determinant of private capital inflow. 
Ahmed et al (2005) point out that those countries ranked high in terms of law and 
order, attract private capital flow. Álvarez (2015) posit that countries that possess 
high-quality public services attract more investment. Government effectiveness 
and regulatory quality is the most important driver of private capital flows. In 
addition, Álvarez (2015) points out that the role of quality institutions become more 
crucial during financial crises. This is because domestic investors tend to invest 
more when they live in a country that has a sound institutional framework. This can 
also make up for the declining capital inflows during the financial meltdown.  
 
C. Investment environment  
Three vital ingredients make an environment attractive to private capital flows, 
namely; the degree of openness in the economy, the exchange rate regime, and 
exchange control (Ahmed et al, 2005). It is important to note that investors 
generally prefer an economy that is open to trade. This is because direct investors 
are not only interested in serving the local market but also exporting goods (Ahmed 
et al, 2005). On the other hand, there is no clear relationship between the inflow of 
portfolio investment and trade openness. 
 
In addition, exchange rate volatility has an adverse impact on the FDI inflow. 
According to Ahmed et al (2005), exchange rate volatility brings uncertainty of 
demand for goods from the exported-oriented firm. As a result, the profitability of 
FDI can reduce significantly. There is no clear correlation between exchange rate 
volatility and portfolio investment. In addition, Ahmed et al (2005) point out that 
capital account control restricts the inflow of private capital.   
 
D. Infrastructure development 
Good infrastructure is paramount in attracting private capital. Ahmed et al (2005) 
point out that good and reliable infrastructure boost productivity and attract FDI. It 
facilitates communication between the parent and subsidiary firms and makes the 
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information gathering process easier. Hence, countries that have good 
infrastructure tend to attract more FDI. This also forms part of the reason some 
African countries struggle in attracting FDI (Lawrence, 2002). For instance, 
Ogunjimi and Amune (2017) argue the low levels of FDI inflow in Nigeria are 
directly caused by low levels of savings and infrastructure development.  
 
E. Finance development  
Countries with a well-developed financial market are able to attract more private 
capital flows. It is often postulated that private capital flow can stimulate economic 
growth in the host country, however, this only works when there is a well-developed 
financial market. Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi and Yawson (2014) argue that private 
capital flows have a negative impact on growth in the country that does not have a 
well-developed financial market. They argue that deep financial markets translate 
private capital flows into positive economic growth outcomes. In addition, Alfaro, 
Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek (2004) state that a well-developed financial 
market increases the sources of financing for companies and this creates an 
important link between local and foreign investment.  
 
F. Global factors  
Global developments such as interest rates and business cycle development 
influence the private capital flows. Ahmed et al (2005) point out at opportunity cost 
and international returns are factored in the decisions of foreign investors. US 
interest rates are taken as indicators of global development. In standard economic 
theory, interest rates are inextricably linked to a nation’s currency. Therefore, US 
interest rates have an effect on the US dollar which is often taken as a benchmark 
for future economic growth. 
1.6 Literature Review 
There is a voluminous literature on private capital flows and developmental states. The 
literature is so dense on both these issues to the extent that the choice of literature 
inclusion becomes immensely difficult. Following the guidance of the research 
question, this literature review has been divided into two themes. Firstly, the literature 
review discusses private capital flows and their relationship with economic growth and 
development. Under this theme, two perspectives dominate the literature; one 
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perspective posit that private capital flows are unsustainable, and the other 
perspective posits private capital flow induce economic growth. Secondly, the 
literature review discusses the concept of the developmental state including the case 
of East Asia and South Africa’s post-apartheid developmental agenda within the 
greater scheme of the country’s developmental state discourse.  
When it comes to assessing the impact of private capital flows on national economies, 
many scholars tend to look at the composition of private capital flows and distinguish 
between the FDI and FPI. Other scholars study the impact of FDI or portfolio 
investment separately, depending on the objectives of their studies. This is because 
FDI and portfolio investments have a different impact on the economy. Generally, FDI 
is more stable and long term in character. It is considered to be a catalyst for 
development because it brings innovation, technology and technical skills. In addition, 
FDI plays a crucial role in capital formation in the recipient country (OECD, 2002). 
Portfolio investments, on the other hand, are unsustainable and volatile. This is 
because the portfolio investments are short-term investments and subject to abrupt 
reversals. Portfolio investments have earned gloomy names in the literature such as 
speculative capital and hot money because of their destructive disposition (Strange, 
1998 and Bello et al, 2000).  
1.6.1 Private Capital Flows and Financial Crises 
The association of global money and volatility can be traced back to the seminal work 
of the Political Economist, Susan Strange in both Casino Capitalism (1986) and Mad 
Money (1998). Strange provides a diagnosis of the evolution and explosive growth of 
financial markets that have deep political and social consequences. Strange (1998) 
explains that it is wildly foolish "... to let the financial markets run so far ahead, so far 
beyond the control of the state and international authorities. [Financial markets] have 
been erratically manic at one moment, unreasonably depressive at others". In this 
regard, Strange was illustrating the deep implication of free movement of capital as 
well as the foolishness of national governments to deregulate finance.  
In addition, Bello et al; (2000) on the Global Finance: New Thinking on Regulating 
Speculative Capital Markets, bring to the fore and highlight the most destructive form 
of capital namely speculative capital.  Bello et al (2000) highlight the financial crises in 
the developing world including the Mexican crisis of 1994-5, the Asian financial crisis 
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of 1997, the Russian Meltdown of 1998, and the collapse of Brazil’s currency (Real) 
were all caused by speculative capital. Nasser Saber (1999) defines speculative 
capital as short-term portfolio investments that are nomadic and opportunistic. 
Speculative capital seeks to maximize its financial gain in a short period without 
contributing to the real sector. Therefore, this type of capital does not seek to be locked 
into a long-term investment (Saber, 1999). Interestingly, Al-Yousef (2000) analyzed 
speculative capital from the Islamic perspective and likens it to gharar. According to 
Al-Yousef (2002), gharar refers to the risk in which the outcome is uncertain. 
Therefore, gharar is prohibited in Islam because it is a form of gambling that takes 
place in trade rather than in ordinary games. Al-Yousef (2000) concludes that the high 
costs of speculative capital illustrate the infallibility of Islamic teaching and the fact that 
man needs guidance. Inadvertently, Al-Yousef was pointing out the importance of 
state regulation of capital flows. Strange, Bello et al (2002) and Al-Yousef (2000) have 
implicitly invoked Keynes’ ideas when they called for the regulation of erratic financial 
markets, and the flow of speculative capital at the national and international level.9  
The other parts of the literature use the country-specific case studies and illustrate the 
impact of unregulated inflows of portfolio investments. The impact is nuanced and 
varies because of the different policy mix that is used by countries. However, all 
scholars agree that there must be a form of regulation on the inflows and outflow of 
portfolio investments as they are disastrous for developing countries. For instance, 
Bulut, and Karluk (2016) used Turkey as a case study and showed that the abrupt 
reversal of hot money has caused the 2001 and 2008 Turkish crises. The significance 
of their study was to provide the Turkish policymakers with an opinion on the efficiency 
and usability of the hot money policy tools in managing the Turkish economy. Martin 
and Morrison (2008) used China as a case study and showed that speculative capital 
inflow has increased China's inflation. They point out that efforts to reduce the inflow 
of speculative capital may stifle China's economic growth, while the effort to reduce 
inflation through appreciation of the Renminbi would reduce China's attractiveness as 
a destination of FDI. Gaulard (2012) argues that Brazil has attracted high volumes of 
speculative capital inflows because of its high-interest rates and this has had a 
                                                             
9 John Maynard Keynes was a British Economist who strongly advocated for government intervention in order 
to reach full employment and moderate the booms and burst of the business cycle (Jahan, Mahmud, and 
Papageorgiou, 2013).  
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negative impact on the exportation of manufactured products. In the concluding 
remarks, Gaulard (2012) suggest that the outflow of speculative capital should be 
curbed through Tobin tax.10 In the case of South Africa, Mohamed (2010) reports that 
the country has experienced a surge in speculative capital flows from  2003 to 2008, 
leading to deindustrialization in the country. However, Mohamed (2010) did not divulge 
on policy recommendations to regulate speculative capital flows in South Africa.  
1.6.2  Private Capital Flows and Economic Growth 
FDI, on the other hand, has been linked with a positive impact on national economies. 
This is also in part due to its nature. Kinda (2009) explains that FDI provides more 
resources at the firm level and the economy at large. FDI has become a crucial 
developmental tool for developing countries to "catch up" with the industrialized 
countries which are mostly situated in the West.11 FDI provides technological and skills 
transfers that are crucial in the development of the country.  The literature confirms 
that there is a positive relationship between inflow of FDI and economic growth 
(UNCTAD, 1998; Fan & Dickie, 2000; Kinda, 2009; Tyson, Griffith-Jones & Velde, 
2014; Chen, 2015). However, there are prerequisite domestic conditions that need to 
be in place before FDI can materialize and add to the development of the real sector. 
These factors include sound financial institutions and a coherent industrial policy 
(Banik & Bhaumik, 2006; Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi, & Yawson, 2014). 
There is a strand of scholarship that deny the developmental benefits of FDI and argue 
that the landscape of FDI has changed since the advent of financialization. Kalotay 
(2017) has observed that the financialization causes an increasing de-link of FDI from 
productive capacity building in host countries. Although the study has not been 
corroborated, Kalotay (2017) observations challenge the conventional wisdom that 
FDI adds to job creation; transfer technology and managerial skills.  
In sum, previous research on private capital flows illustrates that portfolio investments 
have a negative impact on national economies as they are mainly speculative in 
nature. On the other hand, many studies except for that of Kalotay indicates that FDI 
                                                             
10 Tobin Tax refers to the proposal to tax global capital flows to finance development and combat market 
volatility. Tobin Tax was first proposed by the US economist, James Tobin in 1972 (Reisen, 2002:1).  
11 It is common among scholars to refer to the process of development in developing countries as catch up. It 




is relatively stable and act as a catalyst for development in developing countries. This 
is significant for this research as it gives an overview of the role of private capital flows 
on development. However, besides the pioneering work of Mohamed (2010) in the 
study of private capital flows in South Africa, there has not been extensive research 
done to assess the nature and composition of capital flows in South Africa as well as 
their role in South Africa’s developmental agenda. Mohamed’s assessment of capital 
flows in South Africa is limited in scope as it provides an analysis up to 2009. This 
omits a major shift in South Africa political economy landscape such as the quest to 
build a developmental state.  
1.6.3 Developmental State 
The concept of the developmental state is highly debated and contested in the 
literature. The East Asian countries economic development boom in the 1960s 
inspired much of the literature on the developmental state. Chalmers Johnson 
pioneered the study of developmental states in his seminal work, MITI and the 
Japanese Miracle (1982) (Onis, 1991 and Subira, 2011). Generally, the developmental 
state intervenes in the market to allocate resources in strategic industrial sectors for 
growth and development. Mkandawire (2001) defines the developmental state as a 
state that is ideologically driven by development and their primary mission is to ensure 
that there is economic development in the country. In this context, the state guides the 
market to long-term investment rationality. The primary purpose of a developmental 
state is to generate economic growth, promote equality, and drive social welfare 
policies (Graig, 2017). In essence, the developmental state is one that brings about a 
positive transformation in society. However, there are prerequisite features for a 
developmental state to emerge. In the analysis of East Asian developmental state, the 
following features were considered as defining (Evans, 1995: Johnson, 1999; 
Mkandiwire, 2001; Fritz and Menocal, 2007; Graig, 2017); 12 
I. A small- scale elite bureaucracy that is comprised of the most talented 
individual within the system.  
                                                             
12 It is important to note that the discourse developmental state is inextricably linked to the cases of East Asian 
economies. It is, therefore, difficult to talk about the developmental state in abstraction. This is because the 
key authors used historical comparative case studies to theorize about the developmental state this includes 





II. A political system with an autonomous bureaucracy that will carry out its duties 
effectively. This bureaucracy must be shielded from private interests and 
political influence to effectively exercise its duties.  
III. There should be a pilot organization that will effectively control and implement 
the industrial policy. Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is a 
perfect example of the pilot organization.  
IV. The government must be committed to a developmental ideology. 
V. The state should have a vision and capable leadership.  
VI. There should be a high level of social cohesion and unity within the state.  
In the developmental state model, the state neither follows the ideologically driven 
model of socialist state or the laissez-faire approach of free-market economics. 
Rather, it follows a rational plan which refers to resolute commitment to pursue 
sustainable economic growth that is supported by skilled and professional public 
service (Tapscott, Halvorsen, Rosario, 2018:10). In addition, industrial policy is 
considered to be central to the developmental state. This is evident in Robert Wade’s 
(1990) formulation of the Governed Market theory of East Asian industrialization to 
rival the neoclassical account that credit free-market principles for the success of East 
Asian countries. Governed Market Theory (GM) explains that East Asian countries’ 
rapid development was due to investment directed by the state in the key strategic 
sectors. It is a process in which the government set specific policies to guide resource 
allocation to produce different results that would otherwise not be produced under the 
free-market system (Onis, 1991).   
 However, the central debate around the developmental state is whether the model is 
sui generis to East Asia given the historical, cultural, geopolitical and economic context 
in which it has occurred. The uniqueness of East Asian development has been a 
central debate in literature given that many developing countries including South Africa 
seek to emulate it. The debate has also led to another debate about the construction 
of the democratic developmental state which Tapscott argues that it is a poorly 
theorized concept because it is used descriptively to demonstrate the attempt of the 
democratic state to gain greater control over the economy (Tapscott et al, 2018). The 
concept of a democratic developmental state is also used ambiguously to describe the 
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aspirations of states to achieve inclusive and equitable growth without any concrete 
action plan (Tapscott et al, 2018).  According to Edigheji, (2005), "a democratic 
developmental state is one that not only embodies the principles of electoral 
democracy but also ensures citizens' participation in the development and governance 
processes". Inclusive participation is a cornerstone of the democratic developmental 
state. This is also argued by White (1988) who indicated that the true democratic 
developmental state is "the social basis and range of accountability of democratic 
politicians [that] goes beyond a narrow band of elites to embrace broader sections of 
society" (White, 1988:31) 
1.6.4  South Africa’s Developmental Agenda 
It is important to note that the new government in South Africa did not begin with the 
clear intentions of becoming a developmental state in the first decade of democratic 
rule. However, the ultimate developmental goals they pursued under the neoliberal 
policy framework are similar to those that they intend to pursue under the 
developmental state context. These goals include the eradication of structural-
developmental problems such as unemployment, inequality, and poverty. What is 
different in the development state context is that the South African government seeks 
to play a crucial role in strategically organizing resources to promote long-term and 
inclusive development. This is perhaps why scholars such as Thomson and Wissink 
(2018) have claimed that South Africa’s policy discussion in the post-apartheid era, 
have reflected the ambitions of building a democratic developmental state.  
Before the ascension of developmental state debates in policy circles and academia, 
scholars were preoccupied with the influence of neoliberalism on ANC economic 
positions. In this regard, some scholars have argued that the dominance of 
neoliberalism and its subsequent influence on ANC’s economic policy choices have 
delayed South Africa from its true development potential (Bond, 2000 and Kondlo, 
2015). Bonds encapsulates the argument against neoliberalism in South Africa in the 
post-apartheid era. Bond (2000:15) argues that; 
“Democratic South Africa’s inheritance included an economy that proved not only difficult to 
manage, but also to understand, particularly in relation to financial turbulence and global 
integration; yet post-apartheid policy-makers drew all the wrong lessons from ‘international 




Kondlo (2015) has argued that the ANC government were outsmarted at the 
negotiations table and were made to believe that liberalization of capital would serve 
as a vehicle for inclusive development in the post-apartheid context. Unfortunately, 
this has not been the case as the majority of black people still languish in poverty. In 
the very same economic negotiations, domestic and international capital positioned 
itself to squeeze out every benefit from the transition of apartheid to democracy 
(Kondlo, 2015). Mohamed (2010) reverberates the argument made by Kondlo and 
indicates that both the domestic and international capital were the biggest winners 
from the economic arrangement made in 1994. Mohamed (2010) indicates that due to 
the liberalization of capital, domestic capital was transferred to stock exchanges 
abroad to benefit from shareholder maximization movement that was happening 
across the globe. On the other hand, the inflow of private capital was mainly composed 
of portfolio investments that seek to maximize profit without making a substantive 
investment in the long term (Mohamed, 2010).  
In addition, the influence of neoliberalism in the South Africa economic policy was also 
rejected by the ANC’s tripartite alliance – COSATU and SACP. The alliance partners 
argued that GEAR, as the beacon of neoliberalism, would lead to job losses that can 
never be re-created and this will lead to the casualization of labor with workers placed 
on short term contracts (Twala and Kompi, 2012). The move to GEAR was seen by 
the alliance partners as a deviation from ANC’s core tenets with regards to economic 
management. Moreover, alliance partners’ objections of GEAR was echoed by 
Duncan (2000) who argued that GEAR would lead to more inequality and the biggest 
winners from such an economic arrangement would be big corporates. 
It is important to note that scholars on a different spectrum of the debate on South 
Africa’s development agreed about what South Africa’s developmental agenda entails 
which, in essence, includes overcoming unemployment, inequality and poverty.  The 
disagreement was mainly on the development approach that needs to be taken to 
tackle the above mentioned developmental challenges. In this context, others were in 
favor of neoliberal approach while others looked for a different approach that would be 
suitable for South Africa’s approach, albeit, it was less defined.  
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1.6.5 Developmental State Debate in South Africa 
ANC internal discussion of constructing a developmental state in 2005 set in motion 
several critical debates about South Africa’s developmental trajectory. However, many 
of the debates are centered on the internal contradictions that inhibit the country from 
realizing its objectives. Qobo (2007:34) argues that although South Africa has 
ambitions to be a developmental state and emulate East Asia, the policymakers are 
stuck between extending the role of the state and further liberalizing the market to 
attract foreign investment.  Given the policy contradictions made by the ANC in the 
past, the ruling party seems indecisive on whether they should prioritize the market 
over the role of the state or vice versa (Qobo, 2007:34). 
Other scholars have been pessimistic about the success of constructing the 
developmental state in South Africa. For instance, Kuye and Ajam (2018) and 
Ukwandu (2019) have argued that South Africa’s objective of being a developmental 
state is mere rhetoric and cannot be grounded in South African reality. One pertinent 
issue that makes South Africa’s developmental state objective an elusive dream is that 
its success rests on the possession of skilled and merit-based personnel in the 
administration. However, reality strongly indicates that South Africa’s bureaucracy is 
riddled with ineffective and unskilled cadres and badly managed state-owned 
enterprises (Ukwandu, 2019). Furthermore, De Wee (2016) argues that one of the 
biggest weakness of South Africa that will serve as an obstacle to being a 
developmental state is corruption from civil servants. The problem of corruption erodes 
the legitimacy of the state within the public domain and subsequently fuels mistrust 
that the state cannot intervene in the most efficient manner. Another internal obstacle 
that inhibits the possibility of being a developmental state is the lack of social 
cohesion.13South African is deeply divided across racial lines and this prevents an 
emergence of social cohesive society which is a critical factor in sustainable 
development (Graig, 2017).  
 
                                                             
13 According to Club de Madrid (2009:20) social cohesion refers to “socially cohesive or ‘shared’ societies are 
stable, safe and just, and are based on the promotion and protection of all human rights, as well as on non-
discrimination, tolerance, respect for diversity, equality of opportunity, solidarity, security and participation of 




Although the attempt has been minimal, other scholars have attempted to explain 
exogenous factors that inhibit South Africa from being a developmental state. For 
instance, Mohamed (2010) argues that South African economic governance that is 
underpinned by neoliberal values impede the country's capacity to realize its objective 
of being a developmental state. This is because South Africa operates under the 
Anglo-Saxon governance and in this regard the economic policy is ceded to 
institutional investors. Graig (2017) makes a similar claim that South Africa is not an 
autonomous state as it has liberalized its economy. This has subjected the country to 
external shocks of commodity prices and international flow of capital. 
1.6.6 Synthesis of the Literature 
While there’s a clear consensus on the role of private capital flows on national 
economies, there have been few attempts to investigate their role explicitly in South 
Africa, more specifically, in an era whereby South Africa aspires to become a 
developmental state. A thorough review of the literature shows that private capital 
flows have two components namely FDI and portfolio investment and these 
components have a different impact on the economy. The literature indicates that 
portfolio investments are volatile and they are subject to abrupt reversal. On the other 
hand, FDI is positively associated with growth although that is debatable as 
financialization has altered the very nature of FDI.  
The debate about the developmental state mainly focuses on whether the 
developmental state model is transferable to other countries including South Africa. 
Furthermore, the literature places a huge emphasis on the internal capacity required 
for countries seeking to be a developmental state. While this is an important aspect of 
the debate, it is also important to note that the developmental state is a means to an 
end and in the South African case, the end includes reducing unemployment, 
inequality and poverty. In this regard, it becomes imperative to understand that South 
Africa whether can deliver on its developmental state mandate in the presence of 
unregulated private capital flows in the country. Mohamed (2010) provides a nuanced 
analysis of private capital flows in South Africa, however, his analysis does not include 
South Africa’s aspiration of being a developmental state. This study aims to fill in this 
gap in the literature by providing a thorough investigation of the role of private capital 
flows in post-apartheid South Africa’s developmental agenda. Like any other debate 
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about development state in South Africa, the study looks at the possibility or lack 
thereof in constructing a developmental state in the country by focusing on the external 
factor –private capital flows. It is duly noted that South Africa has set the objective to 
be a developmental state, meaning it is a process that is yet to be achieved.  
1.7  Research Design and Methodology  
The study is predominately exploratory as it attempts to investigate the impact of 
private capital flows on South Africa’s developmental state agenda in the post-
apartheid era. Stephens (2001:3) defines exploratory research as “…a broad-ranging, 
purposive, systematic, prearranged undertaking designed to maximize the discovery 
of generalizations leading to description and understanding of an area of social or 
psychological life.” While there are a plethora of studies on private capital flows and 
developmental state separately, there is hardly any literature that combines two 
subjects in an attempt to carve out a meaningful discourse about building a 
developmental state in financialized context. To fill in this gap, the study takes an 
investigative stance which is a characteristic of exploratory research (Neuman, 
2014:38). 
Due to the exploratory nature of the research, the study has predominantly used the 
qualitative approach. It makes use of data that is collected from academic literature 
such as books and academic journals as well as research from government 
publications and international institutions. In addition, the study has also used 
quantitative figures such as graphs, maps and statistical evidence to supplement the 
qualitative nature of the study. Maxell (2010:478) posit that the advantage of using 
quantitative data in the qualitative study is that it can help “… identify patterns that are 
not apparent simply from the unquantitized qualitative data”. The quantitative data is 
sourced from secondary sources such as South African Reserve Bank (SARB), 
Statistic South Africa (StatsSA), and academic literature. The statistical evidence is 
used to describe the nature and character of private capital flows in South Africa in 
chapter three. Due to lack of expertise in extracting raw economic data and in the 
interpretation of primary statistics, the researcher has relied on secondary 
interpretation and explanation of statistical data. The researcher has also cross-
checked the data to ensure reliability and validity. In some instance, the researcher 
has compiled the data from various statistical reports to present a coherent and 
surmised view.  
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1.8 Limitations and the Delimitations of the Study  
This study has several limitations. Firstly, it has relied on data that has been collected 
and interpreted by other scholars. In this regard, the study cannot make a guarantee 
that some of the data is unbiased or absolutely correct. Secondly, this study is mainly 
situated in the discipline of International Political Economy, while some of the terms 
used are derived from finance and economics literature. In this regards, the researcher 
runs the risk of oversimplifying those terms. In terms of delimitations, the scope of the 
study is limited to the South African case and its development agenda in the post-
apartheid era (1994 to 2018). It is duly noted that the period preceding democratic 
transition might enrich the study given that the apartheid regime had emphasized 
capital controls. However, for focused analysis, the study has limited its scope to the 
post-apartheid period.  
1.9 Organization of the Study 
Chapter One: This section introduces the study by providing context, research 
questions and the literature review.  
Chapter Two: This section outlines the Marxism political economy as a theoretical 
framework, in particular, the theory of financialization. Theory of financialization from 
Marxist Political Economy provides a thorough argument about the proliferation of 
finance in the global economy as well as its social implication. South Africa is one of 
the countries that has been highly financialized in the post-apartheid context through 
market conforming policies. Thus, the theory of financialization becomes a suitable 
theoretical tool to guide the study.  
Chapter Three: Influx of private capital inflows did not happen in a vacuum in South 
Africa, the government took deliberate steps to liberalize finance to attract private 
capital inflows. This move was premised on the belief that private capital inflows can 
induce long term and inclusive development in the country. Therefore, this chapter 
investigates the impact of private capital flows in South Africa from 1994 to 2018. This 
is done to answer the following questions; has financial liberalization attracted private 
flows as envisaged? What is the role of these inflows in South Africa economy and 
what are their development implications within the broader debate of becoming a 
developmental state. The aim is to provide the reader with a comprehensive 
understanding of decisions that led the ruling party to follow the international trend of 
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financial liberalizations as well as indicate whether private capital inflows helped in 
inducing long term and inclusive development that is aligned with developmental state 
objectives.  
Chapter Four: Once a comprehensive understanding of the role of private capital 
flows been investigated and highlighted, chapter four carries on and discusses 
whether private capital flows accelerate South Africa’s developmental state agenda as 
described in the NDP. In this section, the study elaborates more on South Africa’s 
developmental state and its objective. Then it assesses whether private capital flows 
help to overcome the hallmarks of South Africa’s developmental challenges such as 
unemployment, inequality and poverty that are sought to be achieved through a 
development state model. Seeing that South Africa seeks to become a development 
state, this discussion is of paramount importance.  
Chapter Five: This section provides concluding remarks and it highlights the most 


















Chapter 2  
Theoretical Framework: Unpacking the roots causes of a botched 
developmental agenda 
 “If capital is sent abroad, this is not done because it absolutely could not be applied at home, 
but because it can be employed at a higher rate of profit in a foreign country.”  
         Karl Marx (1894:255)  
2.1 Introduction 
 In the above quote, Karl Marx captures the true nature of international capital flows. 
He brings to the fore the intention of exporting capital abroad which is premised on the 
maximization of profit rather than genuine development intentions. Marxism Political 
Economy thought serves as an important analytical framework to critically analyze the 
role of private capital and its relation to South Africa’s developmental agenda in the 
post-apartheid era. While it might have been the end goal for Marx and Engels to see 
the destruction of capitalism and ascendancy of a socialist society, the study merely 
relies on the Marxism’s frame of analysis to unpack the intricacies of private capital 
flows and their impact on South Africa’s developmental state agenda.  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss Marxism Political Economy in detail which 
will serve as an analytical framework to assess the role of private capital flows on 
South Africa’s developmental agenda in the post-apartheid era. This framework will 
highlight two Marxism perspectives that are applicable to the analysis of private capital 
flows. The first perspective is held by Neo- Marxists, which posits that the international 
structure of commerce and investment helps the developed countries to extract profit 
from less developed countries with one-sided economic arrangements (Szymanski, 
1974). The second perspective is often used to analyze the latest development in 
capitalism namely financialization. The theory of financialization is deeply rooted within 
Marxist traditions which posit that finance has escaped the sphere of production and 
went into speculation because of epochal change in the capitalist system (Lapavitsas, 
2013). This study will be anchored on the theory of financialization as a theoretical 
framework. This is suitable because South Africa’s economy became highly 
financialized in the post-apartheid era due to economic policies taken by the 
democratic government. Therefore, it becomes imperative to understand South 
Africa’s developmental changes through the critical lenses provided by the theory of 
financialization. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The first section 
provides a brief background on Marxism in its entirety. All strands of Marxism draw on 
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another, therefore, it is important to briefly describe Marxism in its entirety to ensure a 
greater understanding of Neo-Marxism and Financialization. The second section 
discuss Neo-Marxism because it is an alternative theory within Marxism thought that 
can describe the role and impact of private capital flows. However, due to its lack of 
dynamism, it becomes unsuitable to anchor the study. The third section discusses the 
theory of financialization as well as the financialization of the South African economy 
in the post-apartheid era. 
2.2 The History and Origin of Marxist Theory 
Marxism consists of emancipatory ideas that were first written by Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels during the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century. The ideas from 
Marx and Engels provide a theoretical foundation that nourishes the struggle of the 
working class to achieve a higher form of life by transforming society into socialism 
(Sewell and Woods, 2000). Marxism emerged as a political movement in 1848 within 
the enriched historical experience of the working class. According to O’Brien and 
Penna (1998:49), the core tents of Marxism were developed at the time when there 
was a transition from the agricultural economy that was underpinned by the feudal 
social relations to an industrial economy that is based on industrial capitalism. The 
emergence of the industrial economy brought many social upheavals as it introduced 
the wage-relations; induced migration of people from the countryside to the urban 
spaces to work in factories (O’ Brien and Penna, 1998:49). Furthermore, it also 
increased commodity production and consumption. This transformation of the society 
resulted in widespread poverty of the working class and periodic economic crises that 
was nascent to industrial capitalism (O’ Brien and Penna, 1998:50).  
Marx and Engels philosophy and political ideas were greatly influenced by their social 
setting. When Marxism political movement emerged, different sects discussed the 
theoretical structures of Marx and Engels' ideas. This resulted in a variety of Marxism 
thought. Moreover, social conditions and intellectual climate in Europe in the mid-
nineteenth century nourished Marx and Engels with ideas that they turned into a 
coherent theory of capitalism (O’Brien and Penna, 1998:50). Hence, Marxism 
encompasses historical, political, and economic strands and they draw on each other 
to create a critical theory of capitalism (O’Brien and Penna, 1998:50).  
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Aforementioned, Marxism is a broad theory that is made up of different strands. The 
first strand of Marxism is referred to as historical materialism which looks a historical 
development of human society. Marx (1894) argued that societal history is shaped by 
material conditions rather than ideas. In other words, social change is not driven by 
human ideas but rather by changes in the modes of production. According to Marx 
(1894:2) 
“In the social production of their existence, men enter into definite, necessary relations that 
are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a 
definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these 
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis, on which 
rises a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and 
intellectual life-process in general.”  
In essence, historical materialism postulates that production is the basis of all human 
life, the mode of production underpins the societal development. The economic 
structure is given a special position as the determinant of societal progress. It 
determines the culture, religion, political, and legal aspects of society (O’Brien and 
Penna, 1998:56). Historical materialism illustrates that every major epoch 
development in human society was due to a specific mode of production. Marx and 
Engels identified four modes of production namely; primitive communism, slavery, 
feudalism, and capitalism (O’Brien and Penna, 1998:56). 14  
The second strand of Marxism is referred to as Economic Marxism which anchors the 
analytic framework of this study.  With the Economic Marxism, Marx and Engels 
undertook the enormous task to explain the self-destructive nature of capitalism. Marx 
provided the most critical account of the operations of capitalism which can be mostly 
found in his magnum opus, Capital. According to Marx, capitalism is governed by three 
inevitable laws. The first law is the law of disproportionality which stipulates that in the 
capitalist society, there is a tendency to overproduce certain type of goods (Gilpin, 
                                                             
 
14 Primitive accumulation was made up of the social structure that was an extension of family and kinship, simple 
division of labour, and small properties. The slavery society was characterized by a class of citizens that owned 
slaves as part of their private property. Feudalism was a society in which land ownership was the division 
between two major classes (lords and vassals). The final stage is capitalism which is characterized by there is 
private ownership of the means of production. The class division is between those that own the means of 
production and those that do not own them (O’ Brien and Penna, 1998:51). Marx and Engels believed that 




1987:36). In this context, there is disproportionality between the capacity to 
overproduce and the capacity of the consumer to purchase the goods. As a result of 
this, there will be a constant period of depressions and economic fluctuations (Gilpin, 
1987:36). The second law is the law of concentration which stipulates that capitalism’s 
primary aim is to enrich the few at the expense of many. Therefore, as the wealth 
continues to be concentrated in the few bourgeoisies, there is a growing pool of 
unemployment and the impoverished proletariat, making the capitalist society ripe for 
social revolution (Gilpin, 1987:36). The last law is the law of falling rate of profit which 
stipulates that competition in the capitalist society forces capitalists to seek innovative 
ways to gain more profit (Gilpin, 1987:37). Consequently, they increase productivity 
through labour cutting and introduction of technology that will improve efficiency. In 
turn, the unemployment pool increases, and the profit declines. Meanwhile, capitalists 
lose the incentive to add to the productive sector that results in stagnation and mass 
unemployment.  These unfavourable economic conditions will propel the workers to 
overthrow the capitalist system and replace it with the socialist system (Gilpin, 
1987:36). From these laws, a crisis is endemic to capitalist society and hence it will 
self-destruct.  
The last aspect of Marxism theory is referred to as Political Marxism. Political Marxists 
argue that a state is a tool used to manage the affairs of capitalist society and not the 
force of change. Therefore, the state should be overthrown (O’Brien and Penna, 1998: 
51). According to Obo and Coker (2014:530), Political Marxists believe that ‘liberal' or 
‘democratic' state is merely rhetoric, the state is an instrument of domination, 
exploitation and oppression of the proletariat. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx 
(1848) points out that “the executive of the modern state is but a committee for 
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie”. Essentially, the state 
represents the interest of the bourgeoisie in the capitalist society. The Marxist concept 
of the state is contextualized within the framework of historical materialism. The state 
forms part of the superstructure that is determined by the economic base (Heywood, 
2013:63). Therefore, it makes sense that the state represents nothing but capitalist 
interests because it is determined by the economic base in which capitalist interest 
reign supreme. In addition, O’Brien and Penna (1998:57) point out that capitalism 
forces the proletariat to be conscious of their collective power to seize the means of 
production. The exploitative nature propels the proletariat to recognize their collective 
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power to force historical change. It is important to note that each strand of Marxism 
draws on one another and constitute a critical theory of capitalism.  
2.3 Neo-Marxism on Private Capital Flows  
The neo-Marxist held a contradictory view about the role of private capital flows in 
development than the classic Marxists. Classical Marxists argued that private capital 
flows went from developed countries to ‘poor’ countries to realize higher profits abroad 
and in the same process it also helped with the industrialization of those countries. 
This point was made clear by classical Marxist, Rosa Luxemburg in The Accumulation 
of Capital. Luxemburg (1913:426) indicated that;  
Realised surplus value, which cannot be capitalised and lies idle in England or Germany, is 
invested in railway construction, water works etc. in the Argentine, Australia, the Cape Colony 
or Mesopotamia… capital must purchase the element of production and thus become 
productive before it can operate”.  
Luxemburg wanted to prove to Marx and Lenin that while it was true that capital went 
abroad largely due to the tendency of the falling profit and problem of surplus 
absorption. There was an industrialization benefit from the exportation of capital to 
less developed countries, albeit, surplus accumulation remains the central intention. 
Neo- Marxists agree with Luxemburg and other classic Marxists about the direction of 
private capital flow from developed to developing countries but they fundamentally 
disagree with the fact the private capital flows help with the industrialization of less 
developed countries. Neo-Marxists hold the position that the net capital outflow from 
the less developed countries is much greater than the one that is ploughed back in 
these countries (Szymanski, 1974). This leads to the underdevelopment and 
entrenchment of the peripheral position of the less developed countries, thereby 
maintaining the binary position of the core and periphery. The Neo-Marxism argument 
on capital flows is formulated coherently in the seminal work of Paul Baran in The 
Political Economy of Growth (1957) and later by Andre Gunder Frank in Capitalism 
and Underdevelopment in Latin America (1967). Notably, these Marxist scholars are 
considered to be the pioneers of the dependency theory. 
While Marx and his counterparts had come to the agreement that exporting capital 
bring about economic development, Baran was determined to prove that the 
underdevelopment of ‘poor’ countries was a direct result of the development of 
advanced capitalist countries. Baran (1957) argues that the existence of an advanced 
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capitalist society hinders the development of poor countries. This mainly because such 
development will be detrimental to the advanced capitalist countries interests. Baran 
investigates the significance of foreign investment, its impact on the current operations 
and its role in the underdevelopment of poor countries. In his conclusion, Baran 
(1957:184) indicates that:  
“Thus while there have been vast differences among underdeveloped countries with regard to 
the amounts of profit plowed back in their economies or withdrawn by foreign investors, the 
underdeveloped world as a whole has continually shipped a large part of its economic surplus 
to more advanced countries on the account of interest and dividends”  
Baran brought to the fore the imperialist and parasitic nature of foreign investment in 
less developed countries. Instead of being a progressive force that ignites economic 
development in underdeveloped countries, foreign investment serves as a regressive 
force that contributes to the underdevelopment of the poor countries (Szymanski, 
1974:26). The surplus that is being produced in the periphery is siphoned off to the 
core, thereby making the countries in the core the rentier states.   
In addition, Andre Gunder Frank advances Paul Baran’s thesis of underdevelopment 
and unambiguously point out that economic development and underdevelopment are 
two sides of the same coin. To Frank (1967:9) “… [Economic] development and 
underdevelopment are the same in that they are a product of single, but dialectically 
contradictory, economic structure and process of capitalism”. At the forefront of the 
plunder is private capital flows. Szymanski (1974:27) argues that the net capital flows 
have been the primary determinant in the widening gap between the core and 
periphery. Similar to the argument made by Baran, Frank (1967) use the Chilean case 
and argues that the surplus that is produced in poor countries is expropriated to the 
metropolis.  
It is clear that integration into the capitalist world-system hinders the poor countries 
from economic development, thereby widening the gap between the core and the 
periphery. Private capital flows play an instrumental role in entrenching this inequality. 
As a result, Baran and Frank concluded that the underdeveloped countries should 
delink from the capitalist world society to have control over their economic surplus. In 
turn, they can reinvest that surplus into productive sectors, thereby inducing economic 
development. Baran and Frank realized that the attempt to induce economic 
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development exogenously is not effective due to imperialist and parasitic nature of 
foreign investment.  
While, Neo-Marxism has critical tools to analyze the role of capital in the development 
process, the recent development in capitalism has exposed the weakness of the 
theory. The central argument of the theory is that surplus is repatriated from the 
developing countries to developed countries thereby creating inequality between 
developing and developed countries. However, the Neo-Marxian theory is mono-
causal and does not capture the full dynamic of private capital flows and their impact 
on development. For instance, the surplus that is siphoned out of developing countries 
does not necessarily make its way back to developed countries but rather it goes to 
tax havens. Damgaard, Elkjaer, and Johannesen (2018:51) report that approximately 
US$ 12 trillion that is invested by multinational corporations globally has made its way 
to tax havens. Rerouting FDI to tax havens means that these corporations are avoiding 
tax and domestic regulations, and this has negative implications for the tax base of a 
country in which the multinational corporations have its origin. (Haldevang, 2018).  
Moreover, the direction of capital flows is no longer unidirectional as more developing 
countries including South Africa are investing in other developing countries as well as 
developed countries. The World Bank (2017) reports that FDI outflow from developing 
countries has increased astronomically in the last two decades and by 2015 it 
accounted for the one-fifth of total FDI flows around the globe. Most of this investment 
came from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) (World Bank, 2017). 
Lastly, South Africa is neither the core nor the periphery, rather it falls within the semi-
periphery.15 In his conception of world-system theory, Immanuel Wallerstein classified 
South Africa as a country that falls under semi-periphery (Wallerstein, 1979:100). 
Babones (2015:49) used the national income to divide countries into three broad 
zones of core, semi-periphery and periphery and confirmed that South Africa falls 
within the semi-periphery zone. In this regard, the theoretical tools of Neo-Marxism 
become less applicable in the South African case.  
                                                             
15 Semi -periphery refers to a group of countries that are neither fall in the core or periphery because they 
have a mixture core and peripheral type of productions. While the core production is capital intensive 
technology with high paid labour and periphery has low capital intensity and low wages, the semi-periphery 
has an even mixture of both (Babones, 2005:31).  
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2.4 Theory of Financialization  
The term financialization is relatively new in academia, there is still no consensus on 
the exact definition of the term and even less about its significance. Epstein (2005:3) 
defines financialization as “…the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, 
financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and 
international economies.” Thomson and Dutta (2015:4) point out that financialization 
reveals the interconnectedness of the global political economy and illustrates the 
unprecedented influence of the financial sector and technology on society.  
Marxists have claimed the ownership of the term financialization and they have 
described the phenomenon as a process that emerged as a result of an epochal 
change in capitalism. Foster (2008) postulates that “financialization can be defined as 
the long-run shift in the center of gravity of the capitalist economy from production to 
finance.” It is indeed a fact that there are sequential events that led to finance being 
the dominant player in the global political economy.  
The ascendency of finance as a dominant player in the global political economy can 
be firmly placed in the events that took place in the late 1970s. Firstly, the Bretton 
Woods monetary system that pegged the US dollar to the price of gold at the fixed rate 
of $35 an ounce had collapsed (Bello et al, 2000:3). This led to the free-floating 
exchange rate system that caused considerable instability in the exchange rate 
(Lapavitsas, 2013:792). This major change in the international monetary structure 
spurred the growth of the financial market across the globe. Secondly, the 
development of technology had an immense contribution to the growth and 
interconnectedness of financial markets (Bello et al, 2000:3). Thomas and Dutta 
(2005:6) report that computerized trading accounts for 70 per cent of the financial 
market activity in the US. This was coupled with high-frequency trading that can sell 
financial assets in the fraction of seconds. Lastly, the rise of neoliberal ideology as a 
hegemon in the global political economy played a huge role in the unprecedented 
expansion of finance capital across the globe. The trinity of liberalization, deregulation, 
and privatization became the driver of neoliberalism internationalization program 
(Bello et al, 2000:3). Furthermore, international private capital flows led the 
financialization in many developing countries (Lapavitsas, 2013:794). Many scholars 
strongly cautioned against the liberalization of the capital account. They have also 
warned that when finance is not linked to real production, crisis becomes inevitable.  
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 Scholars have argued that financialization has undesirable consequences. As 
financial markets become more interconnected, there is an increase in movement of 
capital flows which cause vulnerabilities, particularly in developing countries due to 
widespread financial deregulation (Bello et al, 2003:5). Another undesirable 
consequence is that the increased presence of financial markets cause non-financial 
corporations to abandon their core assets and to hold financial assets to make more 
profit (Mohamed, 2010). Consequently, this reduces investment in the real sector. 
Financialization is also the root cause of the financial crises at the turn of the 21st 
century. It has been at the forefront of the Mexican crises of 1994-5, the Asian financial 
crises of 2007, the Russian Meltdown of 1998, the collapse of Brazil's currency (Real), 
and the global financial crises of 2008 (Bello et al, 2000). Additionally, as 
financialization emerged, the private capital flow increased at an unprecedented 
speed, causing vulnerabilities across the developing countries. UNDP (2007:86) 
report that since the late 1990s, there has been a large inflow of private capital in the 
less developed countries. It reports that countries such as Zambia have a private 
foreign investment that amounts to 75 per cent of their GDP by 2007. While many 
African countries including Cameroon, Tanzania, Uganda and Gambia have a private 
foreign investment that amounts to 30 per cent of their GDP (UNDP, 2011:86). Within 
the same report, UNDP (2011) highlights the problems associated with private capital 
flows such as volatility, inflationary pressure, real exchange-rate appreciation, the 
boom in the bank lending, and the deterioration of the current account. Although the 
report has gone to claim that FDI is relatively stable to portfolio investment, scholars 
such as have Kalotay (2017) have argued FDI has also become unstable in the face 
of financialization. 
Lapavitsas argues that the theoretical foundations of financialization depart from the 
epochal change in capitalism since the 1970s (Lapavistsas, 2013:797). 
Financialization does not merely the escape of finance from real production into 
speculative activities in search of a higher profit. Rather, it is a presentation of 
‘financialized’ interactions between financial enterprises, non- financial enterprises 
and households (Lapavistsas, 2013:798). Three tendencies should be considered in 
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the analysis of financialization. Firstly, monopoly capital has become financialized16. 
This is because large monopoly enterprise does no longer rely on banks for credit, 
they can just finance a large bulk of their operations in the open financial market. 
(Lapavistsas, 2013:798). Secondly, due to the emergence of financialization, banks 
have lost their primary role as financial intermediaries in the global economy. As a 
result, they have restructured themselves to make profits from trading, lending to 
individual households and handling their savings (Lapavistsas, 2013: 799). Thirdly, 
there has been financialization of household income across all social classes. 
According to Lapavistsas, this refers to increasing debt and holding of financial assets 
by the household. The financialization of the households has enormously increased 
inequality and the consumption of workers has been extremely privatized 
(Lapavistsas, 22013:800). The deviation of finance from real production to speculative 
activities is the outcome of these financialized social agents. These three tendencies 
should serve as a point of departure for the theoretical foundation of financialization. 
Equally important, these three tendencies in financialization have taken place within 
neoliberalism context whereby there was widespread liberalization of capital account 
and trade. Financialization emerged within the political context that fuelled its rapid 
expansion.  
The theory of financialization is more suited to the study because it indicates the 
impact of excessive movement of capital. It indicates that the astronomical increase in 
private capital flows stems from the fact that finance does not longer supplement the 
real sector. Instead, the capital is flowing abruptly in search of higher profits without 
contributing to productive sectors. Thus, financialization as a theoretical tool reveals 
the true essence of private capital flows in the present era. Moreover, financialization 
is able to isolate the impact of financialization on social agents and thereby providing 
a nuanced analysis of private capital flow on development.  
2.4.1 Financialization of South Africa’s Economy 
As aforementioned, financialization represents a structural change in the banks, non-
financial enterprises and households as they interact with the growing presence of 
                                                             
16 Foster (2018) explains that monopoly capital is a term that used in Marxist political economy to denote the 
new form of capital that is embodied by big corporations. This new form of capital has displaced small family 
firms, thereby ending the free competitive state of capitalism (Foster, 2018).  
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financial markets. South Africa is one of the emerging countries in which 
financialization has taken deep roots in the post-apartheid era.17 As the new 
democratic government abolished the capital controls, there were inflows of capital 
into the country. This inflow of capital has astronomically increased the size and 
presence of South Africa'’ financial markets. StatsSA (2019) reports that in 1994, the 
financial sector contributed 16 per cent to the GDP and it was the third-largest 
contributor after manufacturing and public sector. In 2019, the financial sector became 
the leading sector in the economy, making up 19 per cent of the GDP. This can be 
attributed to financial liberalization and subsequent increase in private capital flows.  
Moreover, at the dawn of democracy, many big South African corporations began to 
internationalize and move their primary listing to overseas’ stock exchanges 
(Mohamed, 2009:19). This further integrated South Africa into the global economy and 
developed the country’s financial market. The abolishment of capital controls and 
internationalization of South African companies facilitated the process of 
financialization.  Financial liberalization has opened the South African economy to the 
preponderance of capital flows and erratic growth of the financial market. In this case, 
the theory of financialization indicates that this process is regressive for a 
developmental agenda. The excessive capital does not into productive sectors and 
adds to the real sector but rather it is speculative in nature. In other words, it maximizes 
profit in the shortest period.  
2.5 Conclusion  
Neo-Marxism and the theory of financialization provide a substantive frame of analysis 
for the role of private capital flow in development. Although the framework will rely 
mainly on the theory financialization, the Neo- Marxist provides a background on the 
older perspective on private capital flows. Neo- Marxist hold a view that private capital 
flows are the primary determinant of underdevelopment in poor countries. The surplus 
that is gained from foreign investment is taken back to developed countries instead of 
being re-invested. As a result, there is a widening gap between the rich and poor 
nations. The theory of financialization presents a consistent critique from Marxism on 
the latest development of capitalism. It postulates that finance became the dominant 
played due to the financialization of social agents such as non- financial corporations, 
                                                             
17 Although there was a strong presence of the financial market in the post-apartheid, there was capital 
controls in place to insulate the country from the volatility of global economy.  
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banks and household. As a result of this financialization, finance has wandered off 
from production to speculative activities. Financialization as an analytical tool is 
relevant for the study because it is more nuanced and provides an account for the 
structural transformation of social actors as they increasingly interact with finance. 
South Africa is among the emerging country that is deeply financialized in the post-
apartheid era. Financial liberalization and internationalization of South Africa’s mega 





















Chapter 3  
Sowing the Seeds of Underdevelopment: Financial Liberalization and 
Private Capital Flows in South Africa from 1994 – 2018 
3.1 Introduction 
The transition to democracy presented an opportune moment for South Africa to 
chart a new economic path for inclusive development. Instead of charting a non-
conformist way, the new democratic government followed the orthodox neoliberal 
policy framework such as GEAR. GEAR served to reintegrate South Africa into the 
global economy (Gelb, 2007). As a macroeconomic framework, GEAR established a 
foundation that is antithetical to setting up a developmental state later. It emphasized 
the abolition of capital controls, thereby allowing free movement of capital, which have 
a catastrophic impact on the South African economy. The new democratic government 
adopted the neoliberal policy framework, more specifically, the liberalization of capital 
flows at the onset of democracy because it had envisaged that foreign investment 
would contribute to the productive investment in the country and therefore promote 
development (Bond, 2000).18 Indeed, there has been an influx of private capital 
inflows in the post-apartheid era. SARB (2018:34) reports that private capital inflows 
have increased from R5.2 billion in 1994 to a record high of R357 billion in 
2017. However, South Africa remains the highest unequal country with 27.5 per cent 
unemployment rate in 2018 and with 35.1 million South African living in poverty 
(StatsSA, 2018). This raises the question of what happens to the private capital inflows 
in the economy. 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate that financial liberalization and the 
subsequent influx of private capital flows are disastrous to the health of South African 
economy and therefore incompatible with developmental state and advancement of 
its developmental mandate. ANC’s abandonment of socialist policies and acceptance 
of neoliberal principle as espoused in GEAR provided a fertile ground for private 
capital flow to dominate the country’s developmental trajectory. This lead to an 
economic arrangement that is more interested in maximizing shareholder value as 
opposed to keeping the egalitarian disposition that was envisioned in the NDP. 
                                                             
18 In this study, productive investment refers to long term investment that engender value as opposed to 
short-term investment that focuses on maximizing returns and driving consumption.  
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 The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides an overview of the 
financial liberalization in post-apartheid South Africa. This includes the economic 
policies that were made in the formative period of democracy such as RDP and GEAR. 
These economic policies have been crucial in determining South Africa’s economic 
trajectory and its relationship with the international economy. The second section 
discusses the immediate impact of financial liberalization such as capital flight and 
illicit financial flows. The government missed the first initial step in becoming a 
developmental by going with a laissez-faire approach that resulted in massive capital 
leaving the country instead of being reinvested in the country. The third section 
investigates the nature and composition of private capital inflows and how they are 
absorbed in the economy. This is done to elucidate the role of private capital flows and 
their impact on the economy. The third chapter investigates the nature and 
composition of private capital inflows and how they are absorbed in the economy. The 
fourth chapter highlights the developmental implication of private capital flows within 
the developmental state context 
3.2 Financial Liberalization in the Post-Apartheid South Africa 
Financial liberalization took place immediately after the transition into democracy 
through the abolishment of the Financial Rand. However, before delving into the 
process of liberalization in South Africa, it is important to explain the term financial 
liberalization as well as in the ANC’s economic position at the dawn of democracy. 
This is paramount because financial liberalization as neoliberal internationalization 
program and the shift of ANC economic policy position provides a rich context that will 
facilitate a greater understanding of the process of financial liberalization. 
There is a consensus among scholars that financial liberalization refers to the abolition 
of government-imposed mechanisms that regulate the financial markets (Masci, 2008 
and Mar, 2018). Financial liberalization includes the elimination of capital controls, 
compulsory reserve requirement, and barriers to entry for foreign financial 
intermediaries (Masci, 2008). In this regard, a country’s financial sector forms part of 
the international financial market and serves the interests of investors (Beder, 2009:4). 
The argument behind the financial liberalization is that it induces economic growth 
because it allows easy interaction between domestic and international firms. It is also 
argued that it improves efficiency and corporate governance of domestic financial 
markets (Mar, 2018:2). The World Bank (2017) indicates that financial liberalization is 
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different from financial repression which took place in developing countries in the 
1970s. Financial repression which refers to extensive government interventions was 
a reflection of state-led development (Masci, 2018). On the contrary, financial 
liberalization is the process of removing the state intervention in the financial markets. 
3.2.1  The Nexus between the Financial Liberalization and Neoliberalism 
Financial liberalization forms part of neoliberal’s agenda of internationalizing finance 
capital. Neoliberalism refers to a political theory whereby there is an existence of a 
strong state that does not interfere in the market. Harvey (2008:2) explains that 
neoliberalism proposes that "human well-being can be best advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free market and free trade". The state 
is only there to provide an institutional framework that will allow the market economy 
to thrive (Harvey, 2008:2). Neoliberalism is associated with the privatization, 
deregulation and liberalization. Neoliberal policies were first introduced in the 1980s 
by Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (UK) and Ronald Reagan in the United 
States (US) (Fine, 2019: 80).  
Financial liberalization emanates from the neoliberal thinking whereby state-
intervention is said to produce inefficiency and distorts prices in the financial market. 
Thus, the state should be subordinate to market forces and private capital flows ought 
to be liberalized (Bello et al, 2000:4). Prabhat Patnaik (1999:16) indicates that;  
“An economy exposed to the free flow of international finance capital, however, is obsessed 
with the need to appease international financiers, to retain their ‘confidence’: the thrust of 
policies in such an economy, therefore, even in principle, is not towards serving the interests 
of the people but towards serving the interests of the speculators...”  
As neoliberalism became a hegemonic idea in the global economy, there was 
widespread financial liberalization in developing countries. Cross-border capital flows 
have increased so rapidly to the point whereby they have overtaken trade and become 
the driver of the global economy. In many African countries, financialization was 
introduced through the structural adjustment programs that were supported by the 
World Bank and the IMF (World Bank, 2019). South Africa forms part of African 
countries that voluntarily embraced neoliberal principles and subsequently allowed 
free movement of capital.  
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3.2.2  Changes in ANC’s Economic Position: A Shift from Socialism to 
Neoliberalism 
  Before expanding on South Africa’s liberalization of the capital account, it is important 
to elucidate more on the shift in the economic policy positions in the ANC as the ruling 
party which have been strongly influenced by changes in the international political 
economy such as the advent of neoliberalism. From the onset, the democratic 
government faced an enormous task of transforming the troubled and racial exclusive 
South African economy. To put into perspective, DMPE (2014:84) reports that 
“In 1995, it was estimated that 28 percent of households and 48 percent of the population 
were living below the poverty line. Black women and youth, as well as black people living in 
the former”homeland” areas, were particularly likely to be poor and unemployed. There were 
also structural inequalities in the workplace. Under apartheid, a variety of measures effectively 
limited most skilled work to non-Africans, while entrenching hierarchical and oppressive 
management in many workplaces. Most black workers had virtually no prospect of promotion 
or reaching managerial levels, and would work in the same jobs for their entire lives, with no 
hope that their experience would be recognised or respected”. 
 It was very clear to the incumbent party that they needed to transform the economy, 
to break the racialized economic institutions, and create new institutions that will reflect 
the values of all South Africans including the newly enfranchised groups (Ndletyana, 
2015). Therefore, the main objectives of the democratic state was to create jobs, 
eliminate poverty, and reduce racial inequalities. Simultaneously, the government 
needed to maintain investment and ensure that there is continuous growth and 
sustainability (DPME, 2014:814). It was decided by ANC that South Africa would be 
best served as mixed economy whereby there will be a constructive relationship 
between the state, people, trade unions, private sector and the market (ANC, 1992). 
The notion of a mixed economy first appeared in the ANC document titled Ready to 
Govern, thereby solidifying the ANC's embrace of the neoliberal values. However, it 
should be noted that these were not initially ANC economic policy position. The party's 
ideologue was heavily influenced by the socialists' idea of the state.  
During the intense battle against the apartheid regime, the ANC policy position was 
influenced by socialism (Sampaio, 2014:78). This is evident in the Freedom Charter 
which stipulates that “the mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and the monopoly 
industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole” (Freedom 
Charter, 1955). These socialist proclamations were further reiterated by Nelson 
Mandela in 1990 when he indicated that "the nationalisation of the mines, banks and 
monopoly industries is the policy of the ANC, and a change or modification of our views 
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in this regard is inconceivable"(Mandela, 1990). However, at the dawn of democracy, 
the ANC economic position changed and this can be attributed to the change in the 
international ideational structure.  
South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy coincided with the ascendency 
of neoliberalism in the global economy and this had a profound impact not only on the 
economic development of South Africa but on the ANC economic policy decisions. As 
neoliberalism influence rose exponentially across the globe, the ANC economic policy 
choices became heavily constrained. Handley (2005:22) point out that the ANC 
abandoned its soft-left policies due to internal pressure from the business community 
and the international community’s consensus on the neoliberal reforms. This was 
compounded by the fact that the Soviet Union as a sponsor of the liberation of the 
movement in South Africa and the vanguard of socialist ideas in the international 
community became weakened in Cold War and thus pushed the ANC into the 
negotiation table with the apartheid regime (Kondlo, 2015:5). This meant that the ANC 
could not turn South Africa into an interventionist state as this was frowned upon by 
the international and the local business community. Moreover, the ANC came to 
believe the orthodox idea that by opening up their capital account, they will attract 
foreign investment which will modernize and assist in the development of the South 
African economy (Bond, 2000).  
3.2.3 The Abolition of Financial Rand in South Africa  
Consequently, the newly democratically elected government began, soon after the 
democratic election, the process of financial liberalization and the creation of market 
conforming policies. The RDP was the first coherent economic policy framework from 
the ANC in government. RDP sought to reduce large social and economic inequalities 
that had been erected by the apartheid system. It placed an emphasis on the 
investment of the people, reduction of poverty by empowering people and long-term 
development (Roux, 2017:195). RDP has been subject to many interpretations and 
there is no consensus among scholars whether it was fundamentally socialist or 
neoliberal in nature. This is because there is an overlap of socialist and neoliberal 
values. For example, in the RDP, there is a decommodification of basic goods such 
as housing (O’Malley, 1994). Whilst, with regards to economic management, RDP has 
embraced orthodox economic ideas such as reducing government expenditure, 
endorsement of the Reserve Bank’s independence and promoting international 
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competitiveness (O’Malley, 1994). While it might be subject to different interpretation, 
the embrace of orthodox ideas in RDP marks the penetration of neoliberalism in South 
Africa and within the ruling elite. Hadley (2005:224) report that RDP document went 
through six drafts and the final version which was released in September 1994 
departed largely from the goals and ethos of the first draft (Hadley, 2005:224). The 
final version was a reflection of the victory of the market, marking the penetration of 
neoliberalism within the key ANC policymakers (Bond, 2000:98). This was reflected 
during the implementation of the program when the Minister of RDP, Jay Naidoo: 
“… had other constituents now: 'the markets' as they were impersonally known. His mandate 
from the ANC leadership - to 'send out signals to the markets' - turned out to be a simple 
matter of running the newly drafted RDP White Paper past big capital's two leading organic 
intellectuals (Bobby Godsell of Anglo and Rudolf Gouws of Rand Merchant Bank) and getting 
good reviews from Jim Jones, Alan Fine and Greta Steyn [journalists] at Business Day. Only 
then did the cabinet get a look..." (Bond, 2000:98).  
More importantly, under the RDP program, the South African government began to 
promote the country’s international competitiveness (Sampaio, 2014:80). Gelb 
(2007:2) indicates that financial liberalization and re-integration of South Africa's 
capital markets were formulated, and some were legislated before the accession of 
the new government. In 1995, the Minister of Finance, Christo Liebenberg announced 
that the Government of National Unity has decided to abolish the financial rand and 
dual exchange rate system (Liebenberg, 1995:25).19Liebenberg indicated that the 
reason for this termination is because the financial rand system may discourage the 
new foreign investment in the future (Liebenberg, 1995: 25). The abolition of the 
financial rand, which served as a control mechanism of private capital flows, was an 
indicator of the influence of neoliberalism within the ANC. Gelb (2007:3) posit that; 
“Alternative positions – particularly with respect to financial liberalization – were in some sense 
‘unthinkable’, because the economy had just experienced several years of stagnation and 
stop-go growth cycles resulting exactly from a closed financial system and the absence of 
foreign capital inflows due to sanctions, disinvestment and so on. The need for capital inflows 
to support growth had been strongly argued by the ANC for years – could it now turn round 
and credibly propose growth policies without encouraging and enabling inflows?”  
                                                             
19 Financial Rand refers to exchange rate controls that were established in the 1960s which imposed controls 
on capital flows between Johannesburg and London (Barr and Kantor, 1983:13). The South African Reserve 
Bank formally adopted the Financial Rand in January 1979 as a policy to managing the floating exchange of the 
commercial Rand (Barr and Kantor, 1983:13). 
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Nonetheless, RDP was short-lived as an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the 
Keynesian approach which was devised by the South African Macroeconomic 
Research Group (MERG) and the neoliberal framework that was favored by the 
business and the international community (Adelzadeh, 1996: 66). In practice, RDP 
reflected welfare capitalism whereby the capitalist system would continue 
uninterrupted and the government would simply carry out huge social programs as 
part of the transformation and redress.  
In 1996, the government replaced the RDP with GEAR which provided the clearest 
commitment to neoliberalism. GEAR is a macroeconomic strategy that sought to make 
South Africa a globally competitive economy, broaden the employment, and 
redistribute opportunities in favor of the poor (GEAR, 1996:1). There are three broad 
policy themes covered by GEAR. Firstly, it sought to enforce macro-economic 
discipline by reducing the budget deficit, reducing government debt, and reducing 
government burden (GEAR, 1996). Secondly, it sought to increase international 
competitiveness by abolishing exchange rate controls, reducing tariffs, and to 
encourage foreign investment in the country (GEAR, 1996). In this regard, there would 
be free movement of capital and foreign investors can easily expand their portfolios by 
venturing into the South African market. Thirdly, it sought to free up markets by 
privatizing some of the state-owned enterprises (GEAR, 1996 and Roux, 2017). These 
were clear neoliberal tenets.  
 GEAR came as a response to the international capital market pressure instead of 
domestic needs (Hadley, 2005:224). It was a response to the currency depreciation 
that had a substantial impact on the country mainly because of financial rand and the 
dual exchange rate system that had been abolished in 1995 (Hadley, 2005:224). In 
2001, Rob Davis (cited in Handley, 2005) confirmed that "the main impact in the 
[GEAR] was made by the global currency markets, and specifically, by the heavy shift 
against the Rand". Therefore, the policy was designed in part to send a positive 
message and surety to foreign investors that South Africa was committed to 
macroeconomic stability. This indicates that the abolition of financial rand was a 
premature move by the new ruling elite as introduced deep complexity in the economy. 
Handley (2005:226) indicates that the greatest highlight of the policy was that the 
government came to understand the important role of FDI. Guelke (1999:170) states 
that “the recognition that the confidence of the markets could only be maintained by a 
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commitment to financial orthodoxy and the belief that such confidence was vital to, 
subject to the country’s ability to attract inward investment ... underpinned the 
government’s economic policies”. Hence, the policy stressed further liberalization of 
exchange rate controls.  
However, GEAR was heavily criticized mainly by the left-leaning tripartite alliance in 
part because they were not consulted in the formulation of the policy (Qobo, 2007:38). 
COSATU proclaimed that “we have serious reservations over conservative fiscal 
policies that the document intends to implement” (Bond, 1996:79). It was also criticized 
because of the policy's neoliberal stance. On the other hand, the South African 
business community did not have input in the formulation of GEAR. However, they 
open-heartedly welcomed the policy because it sought to provide macroeconomic 
policy predictability which in turn creates a stable environment for investments and 
business decision making (Hadley, 2005:228).  
In sum, South Africa began to liberalize its capital account during the formative years 
of democracy. The ascendency of neoliberalism as a hegemonic idea in the 
international political economy had a substantial influence in economic policies of 
South Africa and this clearly illustrated in GEAR. The idea behind the financial 
deregulation was to attract foreign investment which the government believed would 
be deus ex machina for development (Carmody, 2002). However, the following 
subsection indicates that financial liberalizations sow the seeds of underdevelopment 
in South Africa. 
3.3  Consequences of Financial Liberalizations: Capital Flight  
Financial liberalization had severe consequences for South Africa’s development 
agenda as there was a massive capital flight that could have been used as part of the 
development project to diversify the country’s industrial base (Mohamed, 2010:161). 
The liberalization of capital flows meant the South African government had less control 
over large South African corporations (Mohammed, 2010:161). Due to the free 
movement of capital, South African corporations moved their primary listing from the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) to stock exchanges abroad (Mohamed, 
2010:161). There are two reasons for this move. Firstly, there was a fear from white 
conglomerates of losing political control and the future of economic policy in the 
country. In essence, by moving their primary listing to the foreign stock exchange, 
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white-dominated corporations were moving their assets away from the new 
government (Mohamed, 2010:46 and Ashman et al, 2014: 33). Secondly, South 
Africa’s transition to democracy coincided with prominent changes in the global 
economy. Mohamed (2010:44) states that in the1990s, there was a rise of shareholder 
value movement and institutional investors as part of financialization. In this regard, 
corporations focused on the maximization of shareholder value and there was a frenzy 
of mergers and acquisitions. South African corporations took advantages of global 
changes and internationalized their operations and participated in the mergers and 
acquisitions (Ashman et al, 2014:34). This led to the concentration of their business to 
core sectors despite the attempt to unbundle and restructure their corporations as part 
of the transformation strategy (Mohamed, 2010:47).  
The internationalization of South African corporations led to a massive capital flight 
that amounted to 10 per cent of GDP in 1998(Mohamed, 2006:24). This is the capital 
that is yet to return to the country. Mohamed (2010:46) states the move of South 
African corporations to London Stock Exchange was supposed to allow them to raise 
capital to invest in South Africa. They have managed to raise capital, however, they 
have not invested it in South Africa (Mohamed, 2010:46). This impedes South Africa’s 
development as it represents a huge misallocation of capital in the country. In addition, 
capital flight has severely affected the economy in the form of a loss in tax revenue, 
private investment and potential public investment (Mohamed, 2019:206). 
Nonetheless, the new democratic government did not interfere in these conglomerates 
because they did not want to lose credibility with other potential investors. This the first 
crucial step that the government had missed to create a developmental state. Scholars 
such as Kondlo (2015:2) have gone as far as to argue that capital account liberalization 
and acceptance of neoliberal policy framework in RDP has slipped South Africa into a 
‘semi-permanent state of paralysis’. This is because the state has been stripped off its 
ability to intervene in the interest of sustainable development in the country.  
Moreover, the abolishment of capital controls has given rise to illicit financial flows. 
According to AU (2007:23), illicit financial flows refer to “money illegally earned, 
transferred or used”. The removal of capital control means that the government has 
no mechanism to monitor the capital flows, thus giving rise to the illicit money flows 
(Reed and Fontana, 2011:23). It is important to note that illicit financial inflows form 
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part of the capital flight and in some instances, the terms are used interchangeably. 
Kapoor (2003:3) report that South Africa has been losing an average of 9, 2 per cent 
of the GDP to illicit financial flows. This is capital that could have been reinvested in 
the productive sectors for sustainable economic development and growth. African 
Development Bank report indicates that “investment is one of the most important 
conduits through which capital flight affects human development. If capital flight was 
saved and invested in the domestic economy of the country of origin it would increase 
income per capita and help to reduce poverty”(African Development Bank, 2012:79). 
Thus, illicit financial flows rob a country of its true development potential. 
3.4 The Role of Private Capital Flows and their Implications on Development  
As aforementioned, during the formative period of democracy, the South African 
government liberalized capital flows. The process of liberalization of capital flows 
began in RDP and was later more emphasized in GEAR (Gelb, 2007:4). This was 
done to deepen the country's financial markets and promote FDI as a vehicle for 
development (Sampaio, 2014:87). In other words, South Africa came to depend on 
private capital inflows to assist with the country’s developmental agenda. Indeed, the 
private capital inflows increased astronomically after the transition to democracy. 
Figure 1 illustrates the private capital flows in South Africa from 1994 to 2018. From 
figure 1, the total capital inflows increased from R5.2 billion in 1994 to R71.4 billion in 
1999(SARB, 2000). This increase of private capital inflows in the abovementioned five-
year period can be attributed to the large liquidity in the international financial markets 
at the time. South Africa was also perceived as a haven among investors in the wake 
of the Asian financial crisis (Sampaio, 2014:88). Moreover, after the democratic 
elections, South Africa became a premium investment destination in the Sub-Saharan 
region because it had the strongest economy with the wealthiest mineral sector and 
the most industrialized sectors (Mohamed, 2006:13).  
However, these private capital inflows caused macroeconomic instability and were 
disruptive to the South African economy. From figure 1, private capital inflows began 
a decline in 2000 due to a sharp reversal of portfolio inflows as currency speculators 






Figure 1: Private Capital flows in South Africa from 1994 – 2018 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using SARB data.  
Consequently, there was a massive flight of Rand based assets which led to more 
panic that resulted in the outflow of portfolio investment that amounted to R24 billion 
in 2001(SARB, 2002:34). This led to the sharp depreciation of the Rand as it lost 35 
per cent of its value in the Rand to US dollar exchange rate (Mohamed, 2006:4). The 
consequence of Rand depreciation was a rise in inflation that warranted a response 
of the Reserve Bank with the interest rate hike of 4 per cent in 2002 (Mohamed, 
2006:4).  
Figure 1 further illustrates that there was a continuous increase in the total capital 
inflows until 2007. Thereafter, there was a sharp decline in the total capital inflows in 
2008 due to the global financial crisis. In this regard, there was an outflow of R68 billion 
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(SARB, 2009). This was the biggest outflow since the 2001 currency depreciation and 
the consequences for the South African economy were severe. According to Rena 
and Msoni (2017:24), the sharp reversal of portfolio investment due to the 2008 
financial crisis caused significant macroeconomic imbalances in the country. They 
report that the current account deficit increased from 1, 1 per cent of the GDP to 5.8 
per cent of the GDP; inflation increased by 9,9 per cent; GDP fell to 1.8 per cent in the 
last quarter of 2008 and official unemployment increased to from 22.7 per cent in 2008 
to 23.7 per cent in 2009 (Rena and Msoni, 2017:24). Moreover, the mining industry 
suffered the most from the global financial crisis as the commodity prices plummeted 
(Rena and Msoni, 2017:21).  There was also significant job-shed and reduction in 
investment in the mining sector (Rena and Msoni, 2017:21). It is clear that the global 
financial crisis had a severe impact on real economic activity in South Africa and the 
impact was transmitted through private capital flows. Due to financial liberalization, 
capital goes out of the country at the sight of trouble thereby causing major 
macroeconomic imbalances including shedding jobs in the mining sectors. In this 
context, the state cannot promote long term development without a proper capital 
control mechanism to insulate the country from the volatility in the global economy.  
Figure 2: The Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment from 
1994-2018
 















In addition, South Africa liberalized the capital account because it wanted to attract 
FDI. However, the evidence illustrated in figure 2, which depicts the composition of 
capital inflows in South Africa from 1994 to 2018, indicates that this has not been the 
case. From the graph, there are more portfolio investments inflows than FDI inflows. 
As the literature has illustrated, portfolio investments are subject to sharp reversal, 
cause macroeconomic volatility and have no genuine interest in development. 
Furthermore, the Reserve Bank indicate that the majority of portfolio investments are 
short term (SARB, 2018). Mohamed (2010:50) argues that the surge of short-term 
capital flows fuel speculation that causes further instability and volatility in the 
exchange rates, interest rates, and inflations. More importantly, the portfolio 
investments do not contribute to the productive investment in the economy and 
therefore does not promote development in the country (Mohamed, 2010:51).  
3.4.1 The Absorption of Private Capital Inflows in South Africa 
Private capital inflows have been mainly absorbed by the non-banking businesses in 
South Africa. Figure 3 and 4 illustrates the absorption of FDI and portfolio investment 
in the South African economy from 1994 to 2018. In both graphs, FDI and portfolio 
investment have been absorbed mainly by the private non-banking sector. Sampaio 
(2014: 90) point out the absorption of the capital inflows into private non- banking 
sector has been influenced by a major restructuring of the South African corporations 
and purchase of existing South African companies. For example, the increase in FDI 
in 2001 of approximately R58 billion is due to corporate restructuring of the De Beers 
mining company when there was a buyout of minority shareholders (SARB, 2000 and 
Sampaio, 2014:90). Moreover, the large inflows of in 2005(R13 billion) and in 
2008(R38 billion) were driven by the acquisition of ABSA by the Barclays Bank and of 
Standard Bank the Chinese Investment Corporation (CIC) respectively (Sampaio, 
2014:90). This indicates that the majority of FDI inflow has been limited to mergers 
and acquisitions of South African corporations. This means that there is not enough 
investment that flowing into productive sectors to promote industrialization. 
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Figure 3: Foreign Direct Investment by Sector from 1994 -2018 
 
Source: Compiled using SARB data 
Figure 4: Portfolio investment by sector from 1994 -2018 
 
 Source: Compiled using SARB data 
Mohamed in (2006) and (2010) has argued that the inflow of capital does not add to 
the productive investment in the country. Instead, there has been positive growth of 
household consumption due to the increased availability of credit to the private sector 
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investment in the country has rapidly increased the domestic credit that has been 
extended to the private sector (Mohamed, 2010:47). The massive outflow of portfolio 
investment during the 2008 financial crisis decelerated the private sector credit 
extension from a record high of 30.2 per cent in 2007 to 17.1 per cent in 2008, thereby 
proving the correlation between portfolio investment and private sector credit (SARB, 
2008:31). The increase in private sector credit has increased household consumption 
and indebtedness. Smith(2018) reports that " 77[per cent] of total South African 
household credit balances are now mortgage and instalment sales repayments, while 
23.7[per cent] makes up the repayment of unsecured debt”. This proves that capital 
inflow fuels household consumption and debt without adding to the productive sector 
which will fail to produce unsustainable future growth. IMF (2017) indicates that 
household debt is not sustainable for long term growth because consumers cut back 
on their spending to repay their loans. In additions, the global financial crisis in 2008 
has illustrated that excessive household debt can dangerous (IMF, 2017). In the face 
of overwhelming evidence, it is fair to conclude that private capital inflows induce 
unstainable conditions and unfavorable environment for the promotion of long term 
and inclusive development. By extension, the development state will not be able to 
promote a developmental agenda with unregulated private capital flows.  
3.4.2 Implications for South Africa’s Developmental State Agenda  
So far the private capital flows in South Africa has proved to have no genuine interest 
in the development of the country. This is consistent with the theory of financialization 
which indicates that finance under the auspices of neoliberalism has no interest in the 
real sectors. Instead, it has focused on maximizing profit without making a substantive 
investment in the real sector which is an engine for sustainable development. The 
developmental state agenda will likely not bear any fruits given there is a powerful 
external force such as private capital flows regressing the country in its developmental 
trajectory. For South Africa’s developmental state to successfully promote the long 
term development, it must direct the all domestic and foreign investment into the 
productive sector. This is the cornerstone of developmental state – the ability to 
intervene to transform and promote development. Onis (1991:110) posit that the key 
to a successful developmental state is the ability for the state to provide a “directional 
thrust to the operation of the market mechanism”. Yet, evidence indicates there is 
unregulated capital mobility in the country that is not interested in long- term 
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development. Against this overwhelming evidence, the government still went to set the 
objective of being a development state without addressing the role of private capital 
flows in the development of the country.  
The evidence indicates that portfolio investments leave the country at the slightest 
sight of trouble thereby causing macroeconomic instability. Furthermore, the 
excessive portfolio investment over FDI has extended private sector credit which in 
turn has fuelled household debt, consumption and speculation in the financial market. 
None of the evidence indicates there is a positive flow of foreign investment into 
productive sectors. Instead, the private capital flows have expanded the financial 
markets in South Africa. The increasing levels of capital inflows have converted the 
financial system into the most dynamic sector in the South African (Sampaio, 2014: 
91). StatsSA (2019) reports indicate that the financial sector has become the leading 
sector in South Africa with the contribution of 19.8 per cent in 2017. It has overtaken 
the manufacturing sector which has declined considerably in the post-apartheid ere 
due to lack of investment among other things.  The pertinent question remains that 
how can South Africa want to build a developmental state with unregulated private 
capital flows given its destructive dispositions as the evidence has suggested. There 
two possible answers to this question. The first answer is one that has been raised in 
the literature that South Africa’s objective to become a developmental state is mere 
rhetoric and realistic conditions do not allow the emergence of the developmental state 
that can effectively deal with structural problems. The second answer is that the role 
of private capital flows in South Africa’s economy within the broader discourse on the 
developmental state has been inadequately addressed and thus official have no 
adequate knowledge on the matter.  
3.5 Conclusion  
After the transition to democracy, the new South African government began to 
liberalize capital flows through the abolishment of Financial Rand and a dual exchange 
rate system. This financial liberalization was accompanied by GEAR framework which 
was a strategy to ensure policy predictability to attract foreign investment. However, 
financial liberalization has caused more harm than good in the country. This is 
because there was a massive capital flight from the big South African corporations 
after the democratic elections. These corporations moved their primary listing abroad 
because they were attempting to maximize their shareholder value but also, they were 
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uncertain about the future of South Africa’s economic policy. This is the capital that 
could have been reinvested in the country for development. Moreover, financial 
liberalization aided illicit financial flows as there is no virtual oversight on the 
movement of capital in South Africa. In addition, the capital inflows that the South 
African government had envisioned to modernize the economy and promote 
development has caused periodic instability in the country. Unregulated capital 
movement means that investors can pull out their investment anytime without incurring 
cost when there is a perception of risk. Indeed, investors pulled their investment 
significantly in 2001 and 2008, causing instability in the country. In addition, the data 
presented above indicate that the private capital flows that come into the country are 
mainly portfolio investment which volatile and unproductive in nature. Whilst, FDI 
which is considered to be more productive and stable has been mostly limited to 
mergers and acquisitions. These portfolio investments have been absorbed by the 
private sector which in turn has extended their credit. The extended credit has fuelled 
household consumption and speculation in the financial market and real estate. A 
continuance of the current regime and attitude towards private capital flows indicate 
that South Africa’s developmental state agenda will unlikely to succeed in promoting 
development. A developmental state cannot succeed while capital flows are 
unregulated. This is private capital flows are destructive to the health of a nation’s 
















Chapter 4   
 
Private Capital Flows and the Reinforcement of a Non-Developmental 
Agenda in Post-apartheid South Africa. 
4.1  Introduction  
When the South African policymakers realized that neoliberal policies failed to 
overcome the structural challenges and the private capital flows did not promote 
development, they sought to introduce a stronger role for the state through the 
developmental state model. The concept of the developmental state is deeply rooted 
within a heterodox intellectual tradition which challenges the idea that market 
conforming policies lead to rapid growth and development (Haggard, 2018:2). Chapter 
three indicated private capital flows expand non- productive sectors and this 
problematic as the country needs investment into productive sectors such as 
manufacturing. The argument provided in chapter three mirrors that of a theory of 
financialization which indicate that capital flows have escaped their primary role of 
being a supplement to real production to largely being speculative.  
This chapter continues the discussion and illustrates that the private capital flows 
derail South Africa’s quest to being a developmental state and reinforces a non-
developmental state agenda in the post-apartheid era. This is done by exacerbating 
structural challenges that South Africa seeks to achieve through the developmental 
state model. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows; the first section discusses 
South Africa’s conception of the developmental state including the objectives it seeks 
to achieve. Thereafter, the second section indicates that private capital flows reinforce 
a non- developmental state agenda as they obliterate the same objectives that the 
country is seeking to overcome through the developmental state model. The third 
section discusses reasons that private capital flows and the exchange rate regime 
continues uninterrupted even in the context where the government seeks to build the 
capacity for the developmental state. Given that there is overwhelming evidence that 
private capital flows without clear state guidance do not accelerate South African 
developmental objectives, it comes imperative to understand the reluctance of the 





4.2 South Africa’s Developmental State 
South Africa has committed to becoming a developmental state to overcome its 
developmental challenges such as unemployment, inequality and poverty (NDP, 
2012). Generally, developmental states refer to “one whose ideological underpinning 
is ‘developmentalist’ in that it conceives its ‘mission’ as that of ensuring economic 
development, usually interpreted to mean high rates of accumulation and 
industrialization”(Mkandawire,2001:290). In this regard, they guide domestic and 
foreign investment into the productive sectors to induce industrialization. In addition, 
these states play a role in the positive transformation of society. For example, the East 
Asian development states’ goal was to drive rapid growth while 
simultaneously expanding opportunities for greater participation in the modern 
economy. This was done through expansion of public services such as health care, 
agriculture and education (Fritz and Menocal, 2017:532). This illustrates that the 
primary purpose of the developmental state is to drive sustainable and inclusive 
development.  
South Africa also views the developmental state as a deus ex machine for its structural 
problems. Edigheji (2010:2) report that the concept of the developmental state first 
appeared in the ANC at the National General Council in 2005 when the party 
committed itself to construct a developmental state that will intervene in the economy 
for development. The idea of the developmental state was articulated coherently in the 
ANC document titled 2007 Strategy and Tactics document (cited in Gumede, 
2017:147). The document stipulates that the ANC aims to;  
... build a developmental state shaped by the history and socio-economic dynamics of the 
South African society. Such a state will guide national economic development and mobilize 
domestic and foreign capital and other social partners to achieve this goal. It will have 
attributes that include: having the capacity to intervene in the economy in the interest of higher 
rates of growth and sustainable development; effecting sustainable programmes that address 
challenges of unemployment, poverty and underdevelopment with requisite emphasis on 
vulnerable groups; and mobilizing the people as a whole, especially the poor, to act as their 
own liberators through participatory and representative democracy.  
The ANC policymakers understood that to have inclusive growth, the state must play 
a key role in allocating resources. Otherwise, if the market was to be left to its own 
devices without any meaningful intervention then the structural inequalities would 
remain unchanged. Mkandiwire (2001:290) posit that developmental states possess 
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the ability to promote sustainable development and structural change in the productive 
system of the domestic economy as well as its relationship with the international 
economy. Overall, the success of East Asian developmental states presented the 
South African ruling elite the opportunity to experiment with this heterodox approach 
to overcome its ailing developmental challenges.  
4.3  The move towards a Developmental State 
The South African government devised macroeconomic policies in which the state 
would play a crucial role such as AsgiSA and NDP. These policies indicated a strong 
commitment to becoming a developmental state model. The failure of GEAR ushered 
a new era in South Africa economic reform whereby there was a loss in momentum 
for financial liberalization and industrial policy debates re-emerged (Qobo, 2007:30).20 
In fact, in 2005 the ANC began to debate about turning South Africa into a 
developmental state (Edigheji, 2010). Consequently, the government in consultation 
with business, trade unions, civil society and international experts, drafted an 
economic plan called Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa 
(AsgiSA) (Roux, 2017). It became the earlier attempt to have the state play a 
substantial role in the economy. One of the key issues that had occupied and 
dominated the policy discussions in the ANC was the phenomenon called the dual 
economy. Mbeki (2004:3) articulated that South Africa is characterized by the 
existence of two economies. The first economy is modern, wealthy and it is integrated 
with the global economy. Whilst, the second economy is underdeveloped; contributes 
very little to the wealth of the country and it has a large population, and it is 
disconnected from the global economy (Mbeki, 2004:3). The existence of a dual 
economy meant that the new democratic government had not managed to significantly 
change the conditions of previously disenfranchised black people and the structure of 
the economy is still largely resembled that of apartheid.21 This is with exception from 
few elites that had been co-opted into white-dominated corporations through Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE). In other words, it meant that  GEAR, as a 
                                                             
20 It is important note that GEAR is fundamentally a neoliberal macroeconomic policy that placed a greater 
emphasis on cutting government spending, relaxation of capital controls, tariff reductions and labour market 
flexibility (GEAR, 1996). However, it failed to reach its target and more importantly to overcome structural 
challenges in the country.  
21 The white minority still held more wealth and the income inequality between races continued to widen.  
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fundamental neoliberal macroeconomic policy, had failed to overcome salient 
structural problems in the country.  
 To tackle the challenge of dualism, President Mbeki proclaimed that government 
would seek to emulate the EU's ‘Structural Funds' in which a portion of the EU's budget 
is directed to less prosperous regions and social groups within the EU (Mbeki, 2004:3). 
This model is based on the notion that the market is unreliable in delivering 
development in less prosperous areas (Mbeki, 2004:3). Mbeki’s administration then 
instituted a range of programs in which the state would play an active role in 
synthesizing the first and the second economy. Instead of calling it a developmental 
state, Mbeki referred to it as a democratic state. Qobo (2007:14) speculates that Mbeki 
completely omitted the concept of the development state from policy discussions 
because he was aware of the uncomfortable relationship between the developmental 
states that were associated with authoritarianism and the democratic aspiration of 
post-apartheid South Africa.22 
AsgiSA sought to ensure the economic rate of 4.5 per cent between 2004 and 2009; 
and growth of 6 per cent between 2010 and 2014. It also sought to halve 
unemployment and poverty by 2014 (Roux, 2017:198). In addition, AsgiSA sought to 
implement sectorial investment strategies, infrastructure programs; skills development 
plan, and bridge the divide between the first and the second economy (Roux, 
2017:199). The important shift in AsgiSA was to relocate the importance of the state 
in ensuring equitable and inclusive growth. Hence, the main thrust of the policy was 
'shared growth’ as the government sought to cross the divide between the first and 
second economy. There was an introduction of state-driven programs to deal with 
unemployment and skills shortages inter alia Expanded Public Works Programme 
(EPWP) and Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA). The introduction of 
AsgiSA served as an indication that the government has shifted its focus from 
international capital markets (which was the case with GEAR) to domestic realities. 
Qobo (2007:1) reports that this shift was indicated by the replacement of Alec Erwin 
who was at the forefront of international trade policy with Mandisi Mpahlwa who had 
previously been the deputy Finance Minister. AsgiSA was replaced with New Growth 
                                                             
22 It is important to note that most of the East Asian countries which inspired the literature on developmental 
states were authoritarian (Ohno, 2013:48). 
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Path (NGP) when President Thabo Mbeki left the office and was later built upon to 
formulate a much more coherent economic framework – NDP.  
The NDP was released by the National Planning Commission (NPC) in 2011 and it 
was subsequently adopted as national policy framework by Cabinet in 2012. It is a 
long-term policy framework that aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 
2030 (NDP, 2012:11). NDP was the government’s clearest attempt to building a 
developmental state. In the NDP's foreword, Trevor Manuel (2012: 1) states that "the 
approach of the plan revolves around citizens being active in the development, a 
capable and developmental state able to intervene to correct our historical inequities, 
and strong leadership throughout society working together to solve our problems". It 
aimed to replicate the characteristics of the previous East Asian developmental states 
by having a single ministerial economic planning unit in government; producing more 
technical orientated human capital; initiating and leading the dialogue between the 
public and the private sector on economic development; and creating a policy 
cohesion between governments’ related economic policies (Gumede, 2017:153). In 
addition, the NDP was an attempt to build the technical aspect of the development 
states similar to Singapore and Japan. Gumede (2017:153) posits that one of the most 
important technical attributes of the NDP is the NPC which will serve as a nucleus that 
plans the aspects of the economic development. It remains to be seen how effective 
the NPC will be in coordinating the economic development process.  
However, both AsgiSA and NDP have not articulated ways in which the state will guide 
private capital flows in the developmental state context. This means that the same 
relaxed exchange rate regime continues in the developmental state era. This reflects 
the fundamental challenge between the state and the market in economic 
policymaking. It is plausible that the government strategically avoids setting a clear 
institutional mechanism because it does not want to antagonize the markets in which 
it has become reliant to finance its budget deficit. The South African government 
believes that capital controls inhibit foreign investment and thus they would rather keep 
the capital account open (Liebenberg, 1995). Government still hopes that it attracts 
more FDI as opposed to portfolio investment. So far the hope without accompanied 
capital regulation has not worked well for South Africa. The next section illustrates that 
private capital flows reinforce non-developmental state agenda by exacerbating poor 
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quality growth, unemployment, inequality and poverty – the primary objectives of 
South Africa’s developmental state.  
4.4 Private Capital flows and South Africa’s Developmental State Agenda 
4.4.1  South Africa’s Economic Growth Rate and Private Capital Flows 
Private capital flows have affected the quality of South Africa economic growth. Figure 
5 illustrates South Africa's GDP in the post-apartheid era. From the graph, South Africa 
experienced the lowest growth in 1998, 2009 and 2016. The first two lowest growth 
periods were caused by external shocks which were transmitted through capital flows. 
In 1998, the East Asian financial crisis slowed down global economic growth and 
harmed the South African economy (DPME, 2014:86). The 2008 financial crisis led to 
a global recession which also slowed down South Africa's growth rate (DPME, 
2014:86). However, the low economic growth in 2016 was sparked by internal issues 
such as political instability and low productivity in the mining and manufacturing 
sectors (StatsSA, 2016). This indicates that private capital flows have prompted period 
economic instabilities in the country. As aforementioned, this period economic 
instabilities have caused harm to the economy as they translated into job losses and 
reduced investment, particularly in the mining sector (Rena and Msoni, 2017:21). 
Moreover, figure 5 indicates that South Africa has experienced the highest economic 
growth rate from 2004 to 2007. Mohamed (2010:42) argues that the quality of 
economic growth from 2004 to 2007 is questionable. This is because it was spurred 
by short term portfolio investments (Mohamed, 2010:42). By nature, short term 
portfolio investments do not add to the productive sector but rather, they drive 
speculation, macroeconomic instability, household debt and consumption, as 
illustrated in chapter three. 
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Figure 5 South Africa’s GDP (per cent), 1994-2018 
Source: Compiled using StatsSA reports 
Moreover, the influx of short-term portfolio investment had a negative impact on the 
current account balance. The rapid growth of GDP was accompanied by a negative 
balance on the current account that grew from -3.5 per cent of GDP in 2004 to -7.3 
per cent of GDP in 2007(Mohamed, 2010:42). Economic growth is a precursor for 
development, however, the preponderance of short-term portfolio investment has 
produced an inferior economic growth which does not promote development. As a 
result, this type of economic growth does not aid South Africa’s developmental state 
agenda.23The following subsection investigates the role of private capital flows on 
unemployment, poverty and inequality. Given that the primary motive behind the 
construction of the developmental state in South Africa is to overcome these 
challenges.  
4.4.2  The Triple Challenge of Unemployment, Inequality, and Poverty 
A. Unemployment and Private capital flows  
Private capital flows have exacerbated the salient developmental challenges that 
South Africa government intends to solve through the developmental state model. 
South Africa’s unemployment rate is among the highest in the world, with an 
unemployment rate of 27.5 per cent in 2018 (StatsSA, 2018). In fact, it is reported that 
South Africa is ranked 6th in terms of the unemployment rate in the world 
(Businesstech, 2015). This has been a persistent issue in the democratic dispensation 
for South Africa. It is highly problematic given that the end of apartheid in 1994 filled 
                                                             
23 One of the primary purpose of developmental state is to allocate resources efficiently to productive sectors. 
Economic growth is in sectors that are non- productive implies investment is not driving industrialization as 
part of developmental state strategy. 
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many South Africans with the hope that the new democratic era would usher in a 
structural change that would induce inclusive economic development.   
Scholars indicate that unemployment in South Africa is a structural problem. 
Mlantsheni and Leibbrandt (2014:23) state that part of the reason of such high 
unemployment in the country is due to a mismatch between skills possessed by the 
majority of the labour force and the skills that are demanded by the employers. The 
structure of the South African economy has evolved due to changes in technology and 
production (Ferreira and Rossouw, 2016: 807). The manufacturing sector has also 
evolved to be more capital intensive than labour-intensive. As a result, there is a 
demand for high skilled labour meanwhile the country is well-endowed with low skilled 
to semi-skilled labour (Black et al, 2017:30). This structural problem has prevented the 
country from using its massive labour reservoir to its advantage.  
Figure 6 South Africa’s unemployment rate (per cent), 1994-2018 
 
Source: businesstech (2018)  
The problem of unemployment is further exacerbated by strict labour regulations. 
Hiring has become risky for employers as there are inflexible regulations on hiring and 
firing (Ferreira and Rossouw, 2016:810). In addition, employers complain about the 
entrance level wages which are high and do not necessarily reflect the productivity 
(Mlantsheni and Leibbrandt, 2014:23).  
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Capital flows have entrenched the problem of unemployment in the country. The influx 
of capital inflows has been absorbed by private-sector corporations. Consequently, 
there has been growth and expansion of the tertiary sectors while important secondary 
and primary sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture have declined 
considerably (Mohamed, 2010: 39). As pointed out in chapter three, the financial 
sector, which is part of the tertiary sector, has increased and is now the biggest 
contributor to the GDP due to the influx of capital inflows. Financialisation in South 
Africa has led to the de-industrialization because South African non-financial 
corporations have let go of their core assets to hold financial assets Mohamed 
(2010:49). This shift aims to make a profit in the financial market and maximize 
shareholder value. This is compounded by the fact that the large composition of capital 
inflow is portfolio capital whose main aim is to maximize profit without adding to the 
productive sector. Thus, there is no productive investment flowing to the 
manufacturing sector. The absence of capital control and productive investment 
undermine the manufacturing sector which is supposed to be the engine for 
employment growth in South Africa (Isaacs, 2016:96).  
 In addition, South Africa needs a manufacturing-led developmental state as opposed 
to service-led developmental state given its unique unemployment problems.24 
Behuria and Goodfellow (2018:600) point out that any country that seeks to specialize 
in service sectors such finance, insurance, and real estate with low levels of human 
development will result in a mismatch between skills demanded and supplied. In South 
Africa, the service sectors jobs require high skilled labors whilst the country is 
inundated with semi-skilled to low skilled labour. However, it is important to note the 
service sector does create jobs for low and semi-skilled labour but not at the same 
magnitude as a well-capacitated manufacturing sector. Moreover, employment that is 
generated in the service sector for the low and semi-skilled labour which includes 
cleaners and security guards has increased outsourcing and informalization 
(Mohamed, 2010:41). This has resulted in the decline of union density from 36 per 
cent in 1997 to 24 per cent in 2013 (Isaacs, 2016:94). Given the South Africa historical 
background, the employment of low skilled through insourcing and temporary 
contracts can be considered to be of inferior quality in comparison to the permanent 
                                                             
24 Service-led development state is a concept that is used by Behuria and Goodfellow to describe a process whereby the 
state seeks to transform the economy through the service sector as opposed to the traditional approaches of 
manufacturing (Behuria and Goodfellow, 2018:583).  
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employment in the manufacturing sector. In fact, it exacerbates the inequality in the 
country. 
B. Inequality and Capital flows 
 According to the World Bank (2019), South Africa remains the country with the highest 
inequality in the world. South Africa’s Gini Coefficient has increased from 59, 3 in 1993 
to 63.4 in 2011, a 7 per cent increase in 18 years (CDE, 2017:5). Currently, South 
Africa Gini-Coefficient is 63.95 which is expected to increase further because of the 
high unemployment rate (CDE, 2017:5). World Bank (2019) reports in 2015,  the 
richest 10 per cent of the population held 71 per cent of the net wealth in South Africa 
while the bottom 60 per cent held only 7 per cent of the net wealth. Moreover, income 
inequality persists largely because of the apartheid legacy that excluded people from 
meaningful economic opportunities. Indeed, the inequality in South Africa is strongly 
correlated with race. In 2014, the income ratio of a white person was 7.5 times that of 
the African person (CDE, 2017:7). Webster (2019) notes that income inequality is not 
only high across race but  across gender and spatial as well.  
Beyond the engineered inequality by the apartheid system, private capital flows have 
also exacerbated the problem of inequality in South Africa. The manufacturing sector 
has resorted to downsizing and retrenching its employees because capital inflows 
have shifted away from productive investment to being nomadic and speculative. In 
this case, large corporations tend to restructure and downsize and this results in 
relegating other jobs to low wage locales (Isaacs, 2018:85). The shareholder 
movement has also altered income distribution patterns as they have come to get a 
bigger piece of the profits (Isaacs, 2018:85). Moreover, financial liberalization and 
financialization have increased household’s access to financial markets and various 
financial products. Consequently, the rich and urban-based households can hold 
financial assets and accrue income from those products. This, in essence, deepens 
the income inequality between the rich and the poor (Azis and Shin, 2015:85).  
C. Poverty and Private capital flows 





Source: StatsSA (2014)  
Overall lack of investment in labour-intensive and productive sector slows down the 
much-needed progress to lift people out of poverty. Dludla (2019) reports that South 
Africa manufacturing sector has shed 15 000 jobs in the second quarter of June, 
thereby adding to the high unemployment rate. In turn, fewer people are unable to 
feed their families due to unemployment. Table 2 depicts poverty headcount in 2006, 
2009 and 2011, there is a decline in the poverty level from 2005 to 2011 using the 
upper-bound poverty line. Indeed, in 2006, several people who were estimated to be 
roughly 27 million people and this number dropped to an estimate of 23 million people 
in 2011. The decline is due to various factors inter alia expansion of social safety nets, 
and access to basic services. Bhorat et al (2014:17) explain that the persistence of 
inequality and poverty is due to structural reasons including inequality in skills 
particularly educations; unemployment; inequalities in returns to skills; and low 
productivity and low labour income in the informal sector.  
In sum, private capital flows derail South Africa’s developmental state from achieving 
its developmental mandate. Private capital inflows have expanded the service sector 
as opposed to the manufacturing sector. This has resulted in the inability of the country 
to absorb its massive labour that is composed mainly of low skills and to semi-skilled 
individuals which cannot be absorbed by the service sectors as it demands highly 
skilled labour. Moreover, it has exacerbated income inequality by emphasizing 
shareholder value as well as providing greater access to rich households to financial 
markets to increase their income. Unemployment and inequality have slowed down 
the progress on poverty reduction in the country. Thus, the impact of private capital 
flows does not reinforce the objective of South Africa's developmental state. 
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4.5 The Resilience of Private Capital Flows in South Africa 
South Africa has come to depend on the international financial markets to supplement 
its budget deficit. Abedian (2016:22) points out that South Africa’s national savings 
amount to 15 per cent of the GDP which translates to 1.5 per cent GDP growth or less. 
If South Africa seeks to have a sustainable growth rate of 3 per cent and above, it 
needs to have a national investment rate that is above 30 per cent. Since national 
savings are about 15 per cent, the government borrows money from in the 
international market to make up for the shortfall (Abedian, 2016:22). This dependence 
on foreign capital has led the government to continue with market conforming policies. 
If the government follows non-conformist policies they stand a chance to be 
downgraded by the credit rating agencies. A downgrade has become an indictment 
for not following neoliberal policies, thus making it harder for the government to access 
capital from international markets. Furthermore, capital flows are at the center of the 
modern global economy and both corporation and governments have become reliant 
on external financing. Any measure taken to regulate the capital flows might have an 
adverse impact on the corporations and government access to external finance. Brazil 
is one of the developing countries that has imposed a series of capital controls 
between 2008 and 2013 and this has had an adverse impact on the small non-
exporting firms that have become reliant on the external finance (Alfaro, 2017: 206).  
4.6  Conclusion 
South Africa is one of the countries that has taken deliberate steps to become a 
developmental state. When the fundamentally neoliberal economic policy like GEAR 
failed to promote economic growth, transform the economy and induce inclusive 
development, the South African government wanted to experiment with a heterodox 
approach to development. The structural problems which some were an inheritance 
from the apartheid past continued to linger and the policymakers understood that some 
problems can be solved by a laissez-faire approach. Hence, the government decided 
to become a developmental state to overcome the triple challenge of unemployment, 
inequality and poverty. The government began to introduce a state-led economic 
policy such as AsgiSA and it later came up with NDP which was the clearest 
commitment to becoming a developmental state. However, there is still no clear ways 
that the government will deal with capital flows. As a result, private capital flows have 
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failed to advance the objectives that the South African developmental state intends to 
achieve. Private capital flows have expanded the service sector meanwhile a South 
African need a thriving manufacturing sector to overcome its chronic unemployment 
problem. Moreover, private capital flows have exacerbated income inequality and 
slowed down the progress on poverty reduction. Private capital flows continue to be 
unregulated despite their regressive impact on development because the government 
has become too reliant on external financing that it sources from international markets. 
In addition, private capital flows are the heart of the modern global economy and if 





















Chapter 5  
 
Conclusion; Private Capital Flows inhibits South Africa from Realizing its 
Developmental State Aspirations 
5.1 Introduction 
 The South African government faced an enormous task of transforming the highly 
racialized economy in the post-apartheid era. Prominent developmental challenges 
such as unemployment, inequality and poverty required that the new government take 
decisive steps in a bid to ensure inclusive participation of all South Africans in the 
economy. At the formative period of democracy, the government followed the 
conventional neoliberal approach to advance its developmental agenda. This was 
more prominent in GEAR which was introduced two years later after the first 
democratic elections. When the GEAR failed to advance South Africa’s developmental 
agenda, the government sought to replicate the East Asian development state model, 
albeit with tweaks to suit the South African context. The government wanted to 
construct the South African developmental state because it needed to overcome the 
developmental challenges that it has grappled with since the dawn of democracy.  
The developmental state model provides a unique opportunity for developing countries 
to promote long-term and sustainable development and also ‘catch up’ with highly 
industrialized countries through a state-directed approach. However, South Africa’s 
objective is set in an era whereby finance has become an engine of the global 
economy under the auspices of neoliberalism. It is an era whereby there is strong 
support for the free movement of capital by the international community. Free 
movement of private capital as an integral part of neoliberalism and developmental 
state model from afar seem to be mutually exclusive approaches to development. 
Thus, this study set to explore the impact of private capital flows in the realization of 
South Africa’s developmental state agenda in the post-apartheid era. This study had 
two secondary objectives which were to find out the nature and composition of private 
capital in South Africa as well as investigate whether they hinder or accelerate the 




The debate around the developmental state has drawn attention from many scholars. 
However, much of the literature has focused on internal capabilities and the nature of 
the political system that is required in constructing a developmental state, particularly 
in the South African case. While internal capabilities are important features, another 
critical question that has been left inadequately answered is whether South Africa’s 
developmental state can succeed in the face of unregulated private capital flows.  
The literature on private capital flows mainly focuses on the impact on economic 
growth. It indicates that portfolio investments are associated with volatility and 
speculation while there is no conclusive evidence that FDIs still contribute positively 
to growth since the advent of financialization in the 1990s. There is hardly any literature 
that focuses on South Africa’s developmental state agenda in the post-apartheid era 
and ways in which this agenda is derailed or advanced by private capital flows. This 
study aimed to fill this gap. In the search for answers, the study has utilized the 
qualitative methods supplemented by quantitative figures and the guidance of the 
theory of financialization.  
5.2 Theoretical Considerations  
This study has adopted the theory of financialization from the Marxist Political 
Economy because it provides a critical examination of private capital flows. South 
Africa’s developmental agenda relies heavily on foreign investment because the 
country has low domestic savings. In this regard, the private capital flows need to be 
carefully examined to understand their nature, composition and their overall impact on 
the economy. Financialization proved to be the best theory to anchor the study. It 
posits that private capital flows are unproductive as they are interested in surplus 
accumulation without producing anything substantive in the long term. This is because 
finance has escaped the sphere of production due to the structural transformation of 
capitalist economies. The structural transformation took place in three aspects. Firstly, 
non-financial corporations have bypassed banks and directly financed their operations 
from the open financial markets. In this case, these corporations have let go of their 
core assets to hold financial assets. Secondly, banks have become involved in the 
financial markets to increase their profit as their primary role of intermediation 
vanished with changes in global finance. Thirdly, the individual household also got 
involved in the open financial market to increase their income. In essence, the theory 
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of financialization explains the proliferation of finance in the global economy and the 
social implication thereof.   
On the other hand, Neo-Marxism as an alternative theory to explain private capital 
flows fails to capture the full dynamism of capitalist accumulation machinery. Neo-
Marxism still insists that the private capital flows are still unidirectional, flowing from 
developed to developing countries. In this context, private capital goes to developing 
countries with the sole purpose of extracting as much surplus as possible thereby 
causing further underdevelopment in the poor countries. While Neo-Marxism is still 
important in understanding underdevelopment, the global economy has evolved over 
time and some countries have moved from peripheral to semi-periphery status while 
others have moved to the core. In other words, developing countries such as South 
Africa have also become exporters of finance capital to both developing and 
developed countries. In addition, the surplus that has been accrued from developing 
countries no longer make their way back to the developed countries but rather to tax 
havens. This evolution in the global economy problematizes the Neo-Marxist’s central 
thesis that the development of industrialized countries is directly related to the 
underdevelopment of poor countries.  
5.3 Key Research Findings  
 
5.3.1 Financial liberalization has not been beneficial for South Africa’s 
Long-term Development  
After the transition to democracy, the new South African government liberalized the 
country’s capital account by abolishing the Financial Rand. The government had 
envisaged that liberalization of capital account will attract foreign capital which in turn 
should play a critical role in transforming the South African society and promoting 
development. To accompany financial liberalization, the South African government 
created market confirming macroeconomic policy frameworks such as GEAR which 
served to attract more private capital flows. This firmly rooted the principles of 
neoliberalism in the country. Indeed, South Africa did manage to attract a massive 
amount of foreign capital. However, empirical evidence suggests that financial 




 The results in chapter three indicate that due to the abolition of capital controls, South 
African corporations moved their primary listings abroad and internationalized their 
operations. There are various reasons for this move, inter alia, lack of trust in the new 
government and the newfound ability to maximize shareholder value. This resulted in 
massive capital flight that could have been invested in the productive sectors to 
promote growth and development. Moreover, the abolition of capital controls meant a 
lack of monitoring of private capital flows. Consequently, illicit financial flows rose 
exponentially in the country, hindering the country from its true development potential. 
Simultaneously, financial liberalization enabled preponderance of private capital flows 
which have also failed to live to their expectation that they would be a vehicle for 
development. 
In sum, financial liberalizations mean that South Africa cannot intervene in the market 
to curb capital flight and illicit financial flows and repurpose this capital into productive 
sectors. The ability to guide investment into the productive sector is the hallmark of 
the development state and if South Africa does not reverse the process of financial 
liberalization. It cannot realize its developmental state aspiration.  
5.3.2 Private Capital Flows have an adverse impact on the South African 
Economy  
Chapter three has firmly established the nature of private capital flows in South Africa. 
Private capital flows in South Africa are disruptive to the economy as they cause 
periodic macroeconomic instability. This is because investors pull out their investment 
at the sight of any trouble, causing macroeconomic instability. This is evident in the 
2001 currency crisis and 2008 global financial crisis whereby South African economy 
suffered currency depreciation, inflation, current account deficit, sluggish economic 
growth and increase in the unemployment rate.  
The chapter has also illustrated that there is more portfolio investment than FDI that 
is flowing into the country.  The greater inflow of portfolio investment is undesirable for 
a country that seeks sustainable development given the nature of portfolio investment 
as described in the literature review. On the other hand, FDI inflows in the country are 
also mainly limited to South Africa’s corporate restructuring such as mergers and 
acquisitions. This has limited its contribution to long-term development in the country. 
In addition, portfolio investments have extended private sector credit which has 
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resulted in an increase of household debt, consumption and speculation in the 
financial markets. In essence, South Africa has been inundated with portfolio 
investments that do not make a positive contribution to long-term development.  
Private capital flows that the South African government had envisaged would promote 
development in the post-apartheid have done the exact opposite. As White and Wade 
(1988) have eloquently explained that a development state is one that determines the 
developmental trajectory in the country. However, in the case of South Africa, private 
capital flows to determine the development trajectory. Due to the fact that they are 
unregulated and unguided, these flows go into sectors that cannot promote 
sustainable development. Therefore, in the face of unregulated capital, South Africa’s 
developmental agenda that is framed within the developmental state context will 
unlikely succeed. South Africa cannot emerge as a successful developmental state 
that can promote development when there is an external force such as private capital 
flows that is regressive to development.  
5.3.3 Private Capital flows Reinforce a Non- developmental Agenda in 
South Africa 
Chapter four has established that the primary motivation for the quest of being a 
developmental state is that the South African government sought to overcome the 
triple challenges of unemployment, inequality and poverty. It has illustrated that private 
capital flows derail this quest to become a developmental state by reinforcing a non-
developmental agenda. In this regard, private capital flows affect developmental goals 
that South Africa seeks to advance through the developmental state. Chapter four 
argues that the influx of short term capital flows induces economic growth that does 
not translate into sustainable development. This is because short term capital flows 
are solely interested in maximizing profit and they have no real interest in 
development.  
In addition, private capital flows have exacerbated the problem of unemployment in 
South Africa. Due to the influx of private capital flows and financialization, financial 
and business services has become the biggest sector in the economy. This comes at 
the expense of the manufacturing sector which has seen the biggest decline in the 
post-apartheid era. As a result of this structural transformation, the country cannot 
absorb the massive labour that is composed mainly of low-skilled and semi-skilled. In 
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areas where the financial sector can create jobs for the low -skilled and semi-skilled 
labour, this employment is not considered to be good quality because of outsourcing 
and informalization. 
 Private capital flows also increases inequality in the country because manufacturing 
firms have resorted to downsizing due to lack of investment. This has been 
compounded by the fact that big non- financial corporations have gained the ability to 
make a profit in the open financial market and this allows them to let go of core and 
productive assets. As a result, some jobs have been relegated to low wages and there 
is less social mobility. In addition, the shareholder movement and the ability for the 
rich and urban-based household to hold financial assets has altered income 
distribution. This, in turn, has exacerbated the income inequality in the country. 
Consequently, poverty reduction has been slowed down due to high unemployment 
and inequality. In this regards, private capital flows obliterate the very same objective 
that South Africa seeks to advance through the developmental state model.  
5.3.4 Reliance on Private Capital Flows Inhibits Emergence of 
Developmental State  
South Africa has become heavily reliant on private capital flows because it is a country 
with low savings. As a result, it has to access other people’s savings to supplement its 
budget deficit. Similarly, South African corporations also rely on private capital to 
expand their businesses. This constrains the country on its economic policy choices 
as foreign investors prefer an economy that is both open to trade and free movement 
of capital. Due to this heavy dependence on private capital flows, the South African 
government cannot simply opt for a policy that is non- market conforming as this will 
result in a massive outflow of capital and it will be difficult to attract more investment 
in the country. Therefore, the state is ripped off its policy sovereignty and it cannot 
intervene meaningfully in the economy. This prevents the emergence of a 
developmental state that can intervene meaningfully in the economy. As mentioned in 
chapter one, the raison d'être of developmental states is the ability to intervene in the 
economy and repurpose the market rational toward long term development. However, 
this ability to intervene in the economy is taken away because the government has 
limited control over its economic policy.  
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5.4 Consideration for Future Research 
 This study has presented an in-depth understanding of the role of private capital flows 
in the realization of South Africa’s developmental state agenda in the post-apartheid. 
However, it does not claim to provide a full account of the phenomenon. Some 
questions are left unanswered. For instance, while private capital flows provide a 
glimpse of the role of financial markets in the developmental state objective of South 
Africa, it does not provide a full picture. Therefore, the role of financial markets needs 
to be further explored to determine their influence on the success of developmental 
states. This becomes more imperative for the countries that seek to become a 
developmental state in the globalized and financialized era. In addition, East Asian 
developmental states had relied on manufacturing industries to promote development. 
However, production has evolved to become capital intensive and other countries do 
not have a comparative advantage in certain industries that can become key to their 
industrialization trajectory. Therefore, an investigation can be conducted to check 
whether the financial and business sector can repurpose effectively to become the key 
driver of sustainable growth and development as opposed to traditional manufacturing 














Abdillahi, U.A. and Manini, M.M., 2017. Private Capital Inflow, Financial Development 
and Economic Growth in Kenya. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development 
10(10, pp. 161-199.  
Abedian, I., 2016. Avoiding SA’s Junk-Grade Sovereign Credit Rating. The Journal of 
Helen Suzman Foundation, 1(34), pp.20-27. 
Adelzadeh, A., 1996. From the RDP to GEAR: The gradual embracing of neo-
liberalism in economic policy. Transformation, (31). 
African Development Bank., 2012. African Economic Outlook. Available from:  
 https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/african-economic-outlook-
2012_5k9d0cfl9mq6.pdf?itemId=%2Fcontent%2Fpublication%2Faeo2012en&mimeT
ype=pdf. Accessed 31/01/2020.  
African National Congress (ANC)., 1992. Ready to Govern. ANC: Johannesburg.  
Agbloyor, E.K., Abor, J.Y., Adjasi, C.K.D. and Yawson, A., 2014. Private capital flows 
and economic growth in Africa: The role of domestic financial markets. Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 30, pp.137-152. 
Ahlquist, J.S., 2006. Economic policy, institutions, and capital flows: Portfolio and 
direct investment flows in developing countries. International Studies Quarterly, 50(3), 
pp.681-704. 
Ahmed, F., Arezki, R. and Funke, N., 2005. The composition of capital flows: Is South 
Africa different? IMF Working Paper 40(5), pp. 3-22. 
Alami, I., 2018. Capital accumulation and capital controls in South Africa: a class 
perspective. Review of African Political Economy, 45(156), pp.223-249. 
Alfaro, L., Chari, A. and Kanczuk, F., 2014. The real effects of capital controls: financial 
constraints, exporters, and firm investment. Harvard Business School Working Paper, 
15(016).  
Alfaro, L., Chari, A., Kanczuk, F. and Aizenman, J., 2014. The real effects of capital 
controls: Credit constraints, exporters and firm investment. NBER Working Paper. 
NBER Reporter, (2). 
71 
 
Alvarez, I.A., 2015. Institutional drivers of capital flows. Available from:  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2691331. Accessed 28/09/19. 
Al-Yousef, Y.K., 2005, November. Speculative Capital: An Islamic View. In 6th 
International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance, Jakarta, Indonesia, 
November (pp. 21-24).  
ANC., 2007. Report of the Commission on Strategy and Tactics. Available from: 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/2007-anc-national-policy-conference-report-
commission-strategy-and-tactics-30-june-2007. Accessed 11/09/2019. 
Ashman, S., Fine, B. and Newman, S., 2011. The crisis in South Africa: Neoliberalism, 
financialization and uneven and combined development. Socialist Register, 47(47), 
pp.174-195.  
Asiedu, E., 2002. On the determinants of foreign direct investment to developing 
countries: is Africa different? World development, 30(1), pp.107-119. 
Azis, I.J. and Shin, H.S., 2015. ‘Capital Flows and Income Distribution’. In Azis, I.J. 
(ed.) Managing Elevated Risk. Springer: Singapore. pp. 79-99. 
Babones, S., 2015. What is world-systems analysis? Distinguishing theory from 
perspective. thesis eleven, 127(1), pp.3-20. 
Banik, A. and Bhaumik, P., 2006. Foreign capital inflows to China, India and the 
Caribbean: Trends, assessments and determinants. Springer: Berlin.  
Baran, P.A. and Sweezy, P.M., 2017. The Age of Monopoly Capital: Selected 
Correspondence of Paul M. Sweezy and Paul A. Baran, 1949-1964. NYU Press: New 
York. 
Baran, P.A., 1957. Political Economy of Growth (Vol. 76). NYU Press: New York.  
Barr, G.D.I. and Kantor, B.S., 1983. A theory of the financial rand discount. Investment 
Analysts Journal, 12(21), pp.13-19. 
Baxter, R., 2009. The global economic crisis and its impact on South Africa and the 




Baylis, J & Smith, S., 2001. The globalisation of World Politics. Oxford University 
Press: United Kingdom.   
Behuria, P. and Goodfellow, T., 2019. Leapfrogging Manufacturing? Rwanda’s 
Attempt to Build a Services-Led ‘Developmental State’. The European Journal of 
Development Research, pp.1-23. 
Bello, W.F., Bullard, N. and Malhotra, K., 2000. Global Finance: New Thinking on 
Regulating Speculative Capital Markets. Zed Books: London 
Bhorat, H. and Kimani, M., 2018. South Africa’s Growth Trap: The Constraints on 
Economic Growth and the Role of Water. Water Research Commission. Available from 
http://www.wrc.org.za/wp-content/uploads/mdocs/2601_final.pdf.Accessed 
25/09/2019. 
Bhorat, H., Hirsch, A., Kanbur, R. and Ncube, M. eds., 2014. The oxford companion 
to the economics of South Africa. Oxford University Press: United Kingdom. 
Black, A., Craig, S. and Dunne, P., 2017, June. Capital intensity, employment and 
sustainability in the South African manufacturing sector. Trade & Industrial Policy 




Bojabotseha, T.P., 2011. Dualism and the social formation of South Africa. African 
Journal of Hospitality, Tourism and Leisure, 1(3), pp.1-8. 
Bond, P. and Garcia, A., 2000. Elite transition: From apartheid to neoliberalism in 
South Africa. Pluto Press: London.  
Bond, P., 2008. South Africa’s “developmental state” distraction’. Mediations, 24(1), 
pp.9-28. 
Bulut, Ö.U. and Karluk, S.R., 2016. The Effect of Hot Money Flow on Pre-Crisis 
Indicators of Current Accounts and Real Sectors in Turkish Economy. International 
Journal of Business and Social Research, 6(11), pp.01-14.  
73 
 
Carmody, P., 2002. Between globalisation and (post) apartheid: the political economy 
of restructuring in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 28(2), pp.255-
275. 
Chari, V.V. and Kehoe, P.J., 2003. Hot money. Journal of Political Economy, 111(6), 
pp.1262-1292.  
Chen, C., 2015. The liberalisation of FDI policies and the impacts of FDI on China’s 
economic development. In Garnaut, R, Song, L and C, Fang. (ed). CHINA’S 40 
YEARS OF REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT. ANU Press: Australia.  
Choong, C.K., Lam, S.Y. and Yusop, Z., 2010. Private capital flows to low‐income 
countries: The role of domestic financial sector. Journal of Business Economics and 
Management, 11(4), pp.598-612. 
Chu, Y.W., 2016. ‘The Asian developmental state: Ideas and debates’. In 
Chu,Y.W.(ed.) The Asian Developmental State . Palgrave Macmillan: New York. pp.1-
25.  
Claessens, S., Dooley, M.P. and Warner, A., 1995. Portfolio capital flows: hot 
or cold?. The World Bank Economic Review, 9(1), pp.153-174.  
Damgaard, J., Elkjaer, T, and Johannesen, N., 2018. Piercing the Veil. Finance and 
Development, 55(2).pp 51- 53. 
Das, D.K., 1999. Private capital flows and speculative runs in emerging market 
economies. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 4(3), pp.413-430.  
Davis, A. and Walsh, C., 2017. Distinguishing financialization from 
neoliberalism. Theory, Culture & Society, 34(5-6), pp.27-51. 
Davis, J., 2002. Speculative capital in the global age. Race & class, 44(3), pp.1-22.  
De Haldevang, M., 2017. Why we can’t trust basic economic figures. Available from: 
https://qz.com/1133984/the-global-offshore-system-means-we-cant-trust-foreign-
direct-investment-figures-and-other-basic-data/. Accessed 24/06/2019. 
De Wee, K., 2016. Is South Africa Ready to Be a Developmental State?. Africa’s Public 
Service Delivery & Performance Review, 4(3), pp.488-502.  
74 
 
Demir, F., 2007. The rise of rentier capitalism and the financialization of real sectors 
in developing countries. Review of Radical Political Economics, 39(3), pp.351-359. 
Department of Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME)., 2014. Twenty Year Review: 
South Africa (1994-2014).Available from: 
.https://www.dpme.gov.za/publications/20%20Years%20Review/20%20Year%20Rev
iew%20Documents/20%20Year%20Review.pdf . Accessed 12/09/2019. 
Duncan, J., 2000. Broadcasting and the national question: South African broadcast 
media in an age of neo-liberalism. Freedom of Expression Institute. Available from: 
https://www.fxi.org.za/. Accessed 09/01/2020. 
Edigheji, O., 2005. A democratic developmental state in Africa. A concept paper. 
Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies. 
Edigheji, O., 2010. ‘Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa: 
potentials and challenges’. In Edigheji, O.(ed.) Constructing a democratic 
developmental state in South Africa. Human Sciences Research Council: Cape Town. 
pp.1-33. 
Epstein, G.A., 2005. Financialization and the world economy. Edward Elgar 
Publishing: Massachusetts.  
Evans, P., 1995. States and industrial transformation. Embedded autonomy: states 
and industrial transformation. Princeton University Press: New Jersey.  
Fan, X. and Dickie, P.M., 2000. The contribution of foreign direct investment to growth 
and stability: A post-crisis ASEAN-5 review. Journal of Southeast Asian 
Economies, 17(3), p.312. 
Fine, B and Z Rustomjee., 1996. The Political Economy of South Africa: from minerals-
energy complex to industrialisation. Hurst & Co Publishers: London. 
Fine, B., 2013. Financialization from a Marxist perspective. International Journal of 
Political Economy, 42(4), pp.47-66. 
Fine, B., Saraswati, J. and Tavasic, D., 2013. Beyond the developmental state: 
Industrial policy into the 21st century. Pluto: London.  
Foster, J.B., 2008. The financialization of capital and the crisis. MONTHLY REVIEW-
NEW YORK-, 59(11), p.1. 
75 
 
Foster,J.B., 2018. What is Monopoly Capital? Available from: 
 https://monthlyreview.org/2018/01/01/what-is-monopoly-capital/.Accessed 
06/09/2019. 
Frank, A.G., 1967. Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America (Vol. 93). NYU 
Press: New York.  
Fritz, V. and Menocal, A.R., 2007. Developmental states in the new millennium: 
Concepts and challenges for a new aid agenda. Development Policy Review, 25(5), 
pp.531-552.  
Gaulard, M., 2012. The" hot money" phenomenon in Brazil. Brazilian journal of political 
economy, 32(3), pp.367-388.  
Gelb, S., 2006. The RDP, GEAR and all that: reflections ten years 
later. Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, 62(1), pp.1-8. 
Ghose, A.K., 2004. Capital inflows and investment in developing countries. 
International Labour Organization: Geneva.  
Gidlow, R.M., 2001. Foreign capital flows and economic policies in South Africa. South 
African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences, 4(3), pp.524-541. 
Gilpin, R., 1987. The political economy of international relations. Princeton University 
Press: New Jersey.  
Glick, R. and Hutchison, M., 2000. Stopping Hot Money or Signaling Bad Policy? 
Capital Controls and the Onset of Currency Crises. EPRU Working Paper Series (No. 
2000-14). 
Graig, S., 2017. THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR 
SOUTH AFRICA?. Available from: 
http://www.dnaeconomics.com/pages/public_finance/?zDispID=NewsArtThe_Develo
pmental_State_What_does_it_mean_for_South_Africa. Accessed 20/03/2019.  
Guelke, A., 1999. South Africa in Transition: the misunderstood Miracle. I.B. Tauris: 
London. 




Gumede, W., 2009. Delivering the democratic developmental state in South 
Africa. Development Planning Division working paper series, 9. 
Gumede, W., Govender, M. and Motshidi, K., 2011. The role of South Africa’s state-
owned development finance institutions (DFIs) in building a democratic developmental 
state. Policy Brief, 1. 
Haggard, S., 2018. Developmental states. Cambridge University Press: United 
Kingdom.  
Haiven, M., 2011. Finance as capital's imagination?: Reimagining value and culture in 
an age of fictitious capital and crisis. Social Text, 29(3 (108)), pp.93-124. 
Handley, A., 2005. Business, government and economic policymaking in the new 
South Africa, 1990–2000. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 43(2), pp.211-239. 
Hannan, S.A., 2018. Revisiting the Determinants of Capital Flows to Emerging 




aktlR_T7ek0. Accessed 23/10/2019. 
Harvey, D., 2007. A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press: United 
Kingdom.  
Hayashi, S., 2010. The developmental state in the era of globalization: beyond the 
Northeast Asian model of political economy. The Pacific Review, 23(1), pp.45-69. 
Herkenrath, M., 2015. Illicit Financial Flows and their Development Impact: An 
Overview, International Development Policy. Available from: 
https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/1863#quotation. Accessed 11/11/2019.  
Heywood, A., 2014. Politics. Macmillan International Higher Education: London.  
Iamsiraroj, S. and Doucouliagos, H., 2015. Does growth attract FDI?. Economics 
Discussion Papers. (No. 2015-18) 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1993, Balance of Payments Manual. International 
Monetary Fund, 5th ed. Washington.  
77 
 
Isaacs, G. and Kaltenbrunner, A., 2018. Financialization and liberalization: South 
Africa’s new forms of external vulnerability. Competition & Change, 22(4), pp.437-463. 
Isaacs, G., 2015. Financialisation and Development: South African Case 
Study .FESSUD Working Paper Series (No. 142). 
Isaacs, G.L., 2018. Financialisation in post-apartheid South Africa. Doctoral 
dissertation, SOAS University of London: London. 
Jahan, S., Mahmud, A.S. and Papageorgiou, C., 2014. What is Keynesian 
economics?. International Monetary Fund, 51(3). 
Johnson, C., 1999. The developmental state: Odyssey of a concept. The 
developmental state, pp.32-60.  
Jylhä, P. and Suominen, M., 2011. Speculative capital and currency carry 
trades. Journal of Financial Economics, 99(1), pp.60-75.  
Kalotay, K., 2012. Indirect FDI. The Journal of World Investment & Trade, 13(4), 
pp.542-555. 
Kalotay, K., 2017. The Shifting Landscape of Global Foreign Direct Investment: 
Emerging Patterns. Available from:  
 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3058255.Accessed 
24/07/2019. 
Kaltenbrunner, A., Newman, S. and Painceira, J.P., 2012, June. Financialisation of 
natural resources: A Marxist approach. In Conference paper for the 9th International 
Conference Developments in Economic Theory and Policy, Bilbao. 
Kapoor, S., 2007. Illicit Financial Flows and Capital Flight. Available from: 
 http://re-define.org/sites/default/files/IllicitFinancialFlows-ABriefingPaper(1).pdf. 
Accessed 12/10/2019. 
Karwowski, E., Fine, B. and Ashman, S., 2018. Introduction to the special section 
‘Financialization in South Africa’. Competition & Change, 22(4), pp.383-387. 
Kim, Y.T., 2007. The transformation of the East Asian states: From the developmental 




Kinda, T., 2009. Determinants, consequences and a policy response to private capital 
flows in developing countries. Doctoral dissertation, Université d'Auvergne: Clermont-
Ferrand.  
Kondlo, K., 2015. 'Paralysed by flaws of first-instance'?-reflections on the political 
economy of South Africa, twenty years into democracy. Africa Insight, 45(3), pp.1-15.  
Lapavitsas, C., 2013. The financialization of capitalism: ‘Profiting without 
producing’. City, 17(6), pp.792-805. 
Lapavitsas, C., 2013. Profiting without producing: How finance exploits us all. Verso 
Books: New York.  
Li, W. and Zhang, Z., 2012. International capital flows, the domestic employment and 
wages: Perspective from China's different provinces. China Finance Review 
International, 2(3), pp.286-310. 





0system.pdf. Accessed 12/10/2019. 
Luxemburg, R., 1913. The accumulation of capital. Routledge: United Kingdom.  
Mandela, R,N., 1990. We will nationalise – Mandela. Available from: 
https://mg.co.za/article/1990-01-26-we-will-nationalise-mandela. Accessed 
25/09/2019. 
Marc, S.C., 2018. Impact of Financial Liberalisation on the Financial Development of 
Eight Countries Member of SADC. J Glob Econ, 6(287), pp.2. 
Mariotti, M. and Fourie, J., 2014. The economics of apartheid: An introduction. 
Economic History of Developing Regions,2(29), pp.113-125.  
Martin, M.F. and Morrison, W.M., 2008, July. China's' Hot Money' Problems. Available 
from: 
 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22921.pdf. Accessed 09/05/2019.  
79 
 
Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1848. The Communist Manifesto. Selected Works by Karl 
Marx and Frederick Engels. International Publishers: New York.  
Marx,K.,1894. Capital Volume III: The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole. 
International Publishers: New York.  
Masci, P., 2008. Financial Liberalisation, Economic Growth, Stability and Financial 
Market Development in Emerging Markets. Available from: 
https://www.bpastudies.org/bpastudies/article/view/68/146. Accessed 09/11/2019. 
Mbeki, T., 2003. Address of the President of South Africa To The National Council of 
Provinces. Available from: 
 https://www.polity.org.za/article/mbeki-address-to-ncop-11112003-2003-11-11. 
Accessed 21/06/2019. 
Mkandawire, T., 2001. Thinking about developmental states in Africa. Cambridge 
Journal of economics, 25(3), pp.289-314.  
Mlatsheni, C, and Leibbrandt, M., 2014. ‘Unemployment in South Africa’ in Bhorat, H., 
Hirsch, A., Kanbur, R., and Ncube, M. (ed.) The Oxford Companion to the Economics 
of South Africa. Oxford University Press: United Kingdom.   
Mohamed, S. and Finnoff, K., 2005. Capital Flight from South Africa, 1980–
2000. Capital flight and capital controls in developing countries, pp.85-115. 
Mohamed, S., 2003, September. Capital inflows since the end of apartheid and the 
2001 currency crisis. In prepared for TIPS/DPRU Conference,“The Challenge of 
Growth and Poverty: the South African Economy Since Democracy (pp. 8-10). 
Mohamed, S., 2006. The impact of international capital flows on the South Africa 
economy since the end of apartheid. Available from:  
http://iffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/iff/iff_impact-international-capital-flows-
southafrica_en.pdf . Accessed 22/04/2019.  
Mohamed, S., 2010. “The State of South African Economy”, in Daniel, J, Naidoo, P, 
Pillay, D, and Southhall, R (ed.) New South African Review 1, 2010: Development or 
Decline. Wits University Press: Johannesburg, pp.39-65.  
80 
 
Mohamed, S., 2010. The impact of capital flows on the South African economic growth 
path since the end of apartheid. Working Paper Series 2: Financial Markets and 
International Regulation. The AUGUR Project. 
Mohamed, S., 2016. Financialization of the South African 
Economy. Development, 59(1-2), pp.137-142. 
Mohamed, S., 2019. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ACCUMULATION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA: Resource Extraction, Financialization, and Capital Flight as Barriers to 
Investment and Employment Growth. Doctoral dissertation, University of 
Massachusetts: Amherst.  
Moremo, R., 1998. What Caused East Asia’s Financial Crisis?. Accessed from 
https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-
letter/1998/august/what-caused-east-asia-financial-crisis/ . Accessed 11/09/2019. 
Mosala, S.J., Venter, J.C.M. and Bain, E.G., 2017. South Africa's Economic 
Transformation since 1994: What Influence has the National Democratic Revolution 
(NDR) Had?. The Review of Black Political Economy, 44(3-4), pp.327-340. 
 
Mvelase, M.S., 2015. The financialization of the South African economy and its 
implications for employment, Doctoral dissertation, Wits University: Johannesburg.  
Nattrass, N., 1994. Economic restructuring in South Africa: the debate 
continues. Journal of Southern African Studies, 20(4), pp.517-531. 
Ndletyana, M. ed., 2015. Essays on the Evolution of the Post-Apartheid State: 
Legacies, Reforms and Prospects. Real African Publishers: Johannesburg.  
Neely, J.C.,1999. An Introduction to Capital Control. Available from: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5047182. Accessed 09/02/2020. 
Nesvetailova, A., 2007. Fragile finance: debt, speculation and crisis in the age of global 
credit. Springer: Berlin.  
Neuman, W.L., 2014. Basics of social research. Pearson: Canada. 
Newman, S., 2017. Financialisation and the financial crisis the case of South 




NPC (National Planning Commission)., 2012. Our Future - Make It Work. National 
Development Plan 2030. Pretoria: Government Printers. 
O’Malley, P., 1994. The RDP – A site for social struggle. Available from: 
https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05
lv03005/06lv03006/07lv03084/08lv03086.htm. Accessed 09/10/2019.  
Obo, U.B. and Coker, M.A., 2014. The Marxist Theory of the State: An Introductory 
Guide. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(4), p.527. 
O'brien, M. and Penna, S., 1998. Theorising welfare: enlightenment and modern 
society. SAGE Publications: California. 
O'brien, R. and Williams, M., 2002. Global political economy: Evolution and dynamics. 
Macmillan: London.  
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development).,2002. Foreign 




OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development)., 2008. Benchmark 
Definition of Foreign Direct Investment. Available from: 
 https://www.oecd.org/investment/fdibenchmarkdefinition.htm. Accessed 19/04/19.  
Oloruntoba, S., 2015. Politics of Financialisation and Inequality: Transforming Global 
Relations for Inclusive Development. Africa Development, 40(3), pp.121-137. 
Ogunjimi, J. and Amune, B., 2017. Impact of Infrastructure on Foreign Direct 
Investment in Nigeria: An Autoregressive Distirbuted Lag (ARDL) Approach. Available 
from: 
 https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75996/. Accessed 14/06/2019.  
Oniş, Z., 1991. The logic of the developmental state. Comparative Politics, 24(1), 
pp.109-126.  
Palley, T., 2016. Financialization: the economics of finance capital domination. 
Springer: New York.  
82 
 
Patnaik, P., 1999. The real face of financial liberalisation. Frontline, 16(4), pp.13-26. 
Patomäki, H., 2009. Neoliberalism and the global financial crisis. New Political 
Science, 31(4), pp.431-442. 
Qobo, M., 2007. Developmental State Debate in South Africa. Available from: 
www.saiia.org.za/wpcontent/.../dttp_pap_qobo_developmental_state_20071007.pdf. 
Accessed on 16/03/2019.  
Quazi, R.M. and Tandon, S., 2011. Foreign direct investment and investment climate 
in China and India: a comparative analysis. International Journal of Business and 
Economics Perspectives, 6(2), pp.70-80. 
Quazi, R.M., 2007. Investment climate and foreign direct investment: a study of 
selected countries in Latin America. Global Journal of Business Research, 1(1), pp.1-
13. 
Rasiah, R., 2003. Globalization and private capital movements. In Capturing 
Globalization (pp. 49-75). Routledge: United Kingdom. 
Reed, Q. and Fontana, A., 2011. Corruption and illicit financial flows: The limits and 
possibilities of current approaches. Available from:  
https://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-and-illicit-financial-flows-the-limits-and-
possibilities-of-current-approaches-2. Accessed 02/10/2019.  
Reisen, H., 2002. Tobin tax: could it work?. OECD OBSERVER, pp.23-23. 
Rena, R. and Msoni, M., 2014. Global financial crises and its impact on the South 
African economy: A further update. Journal of Economics, 5(1), pp.17-25. 
Seekings, J. and Natrass, N., 2005. Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa. Yale 
University Press: London.  
South African Reserve Bank., 2000. Quarterly Bulletin. Available from: 
https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/4740/01
Full%20Quarterly%20Bulletin%20March%202000.pdf. Accessed 22/10/2019. 
South African Reserve Bank., 2002. Quarterly Bulletin. Available from: 
https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/4727/F
ull%20Quarterly%20Bulletin.pdf. Accessed 22/10/2019. 
83 
 
South African Reserve Bank., 2008. Quarterly Bulletin. Available from: 
https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/4075/01
Full%20Quarterly%20Bulletin.pdf. Accessed 22/10/2019. 
South African Reserve Bank., 2009. Quarterly Bulletin. Available from: 
https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/4060/F
ull%20Quarterly%20Bulletin.pdf. Accessed 22/10/2019. 








Reuters.,2019. UPDATE 1-FX trading volumes slide in April as calmer markers deter 




Rodrigues Teles Sampaio, N.J., 2014. Financialisation in South Africa: Examining the 
financial conduct of non-financial enterprises, banks and households. Doctoral 
dissertation, SOAS, University of London: London.  
Rossouw, R. and Ferreira, L., 2016. South Africa's economic policies on 
unemployment: a historical analysis of two decades of transition. Journal of Economic 
and Financial Sciences, 9(3), pp.807-832. 
Routley, L., 2014. Developmental states in Africa? A review of ongoing debates and 
buzzwords. Development Policy Review, 32(2), pp.159-177.  
Roux, A., 2017. Everyone’s Guide to the South African Economy 12th edition. Penguin 
Random House South Africa. 
84 
 
RSA,.1996. Growth, Employment and Redistribution. A Macroeconomic Strategy. 
Pretoria: Government Printers. 
RSA., 1994. White Paper on the Reconstruction and Development Programme. 
Government Gazette. Pretoria: Government Printers. 
RSA., 2006. Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative – South Africa (ASGISA). 
Pretoria: Government Printers. 
Saad Filho, A., 2001. The value of Marx: Political economy for contemporary 
capitalism. Routledge: United Kingdom.  
Saber, N., 1999. Speculative Capital: The nature of risk in capital markets. Financial 
Times Prentice Hall.  
Sewell, R &Woods A., 2000. What is Marxism. Available from: 
 https://www.marxist.com/what-is-marxism-economics-materialism.htm. Accessed on 
14/06/2019. 
Sheng, L., 2011. Theorising free capital mobility: the perspective of developing 
countries. Review of International Studies, 37(5), pp.2519-2534. 
Siddiqui, K., 2014. Flows of foreign capital into developing countries: A critical 
review. Journal of International Business and Economics, 2(1), pp.29-46. 
Siddiqui, K., 2015. Foreign capital investment into developing countries: Some 
economic policy issues. Research in World Economy, 6(2), pp.14-29. 
Sotiropoulos, D.P., Milios, J. and Lapatsioras, S., 2013. A political economy of 
contemporary capitalism and its crisis: Demystifying finance. Routledge: United 
Kingdom.  
Southhall, R., 2019. South Africa 2010: From short term success to long-term decline 
, in Daniel, J, Naidoo, P, Pillay, D, and Southhall, R (ed.) New South African Review 
1, 2010: Development or Decline. Wits University Press: Johannesburg, pp.2-21.  









Statistics South Africa (StatsSA)., 2018. South Africa’s unemployment rate. Available 
from:  
http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=737&id=1. Accessed 05/07/2018. 




Stebbins, R.A., 2001. Exploratory research in the social sciences (Vol. 48). Sage: New 
York.  
Stiglitz, J.E., 2002. Globalization and its Discontents (Vol. 500). Norton: New York.  
Strange, S., 1986. Casino capitalism. Manchester University Press: United Kingdom  
Strange, S., 1998. Mad money. Oxford University Press: London  
Streak 1, J.C., 2004. The Gear legacy: did Gear fail or move South Africa forward in 
development?. Development Southern Africa, 21(2), pp.271-288. 
Subira, L.I., 2011. A developmental state in Africa: what can policy makers in Africa 
learn from the idea of developmental state? Masters dissertation, Wits University: 
Johannesburg.  
Szymanski, A., 1974. Marxist theory and international capital flows. Review of Radical 
Political Economics, 6(3), pp.20-40. 
Tapscott, C,. Halvorsen, T,. Rosario, C., 2018. The Democratic Developmental State: 
North-South Perspectives. Deutsche Nationalbibliografie: European Union.  
Thomson, F. and Dutta, S., 2015. Financialisation: a primer. Transnational Institute  
Thompson, P. and Wissink, H., 2018. Recalibrating South Africa’s Political Economy: 
Challenges in Building a Developmental and Competition State. African Studies 
Quarterly, 12(1), pp.31-48.   
86 
 
Thorsen, D.E. and Lie, A., 2006. What is neoliberalism. Oslo, University of Oslo, 
Department of Political Science, Manuscript, pp.1-21. 
Toporowski, J., 2018. Marx, Finance and Political Economy. Review of Political 
Economy, 30(3), pp.416-427. 
Tralac., 2019. South Africa:A 2018trade and investment profile. Accessed form: 
https://www.tralac.org/publications/article/13932-south-africa-a-2018-trade-and-
investment-profile.html . Accessed 10/10/2019 
Tyson, J., Griffith-Jones, S. and te Velde, D.W., 2014. Post-crisis trends in private 
capital flows to developing countries. Available from: 
 http://www.odi.org/publications/8712-post-crisis-trends-private-capital-flows-
developing-countries.Accesed 09/09/2019. 
UNCTAD., 2005. Rethinking the Role of Foreign Direct Investment. Available from: 
https://www.eldis.org/document/A20382. Accessed 08/10/2019. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNTAD)., 1999. 
Comprehensive Study of the Interrelationship between Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI). Available from: 
https://unctad.org/en/Docs/pogdsdfsbd5.pdf. Accessed 25/05/2019. 
United Nations Development Programme(UNDP), 2011. Towards Human Resilience: 
Sustaining MDG Progress in an Age of Economic Uncertainty. 
United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa., 2015. Illicit financial flow: report of 
the High Level Panel on illicit financial flows from Africa. 
Valckx, N.,2017. Rising Household Debt: What It Means for Growth and Stability. 
Available from: 
https://blogs.imf.org/2017/10/03/rising-household-debt-what-it-means-for-growth-
and-stability/. Accessed 23/09/19.  
Van Wyk, B., 2012. Research design and methods Part I. Available from: 
 
https://www.uwc.ac.za/Students/Postgraduate/Documents/Research_and_Design_I.
pdf. Accessed 12/02/2019. 
87 
 
Wallerstein I (1979) The Capitalist World-Economy. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
Walter, A. and Sen, G., 2008. Analyzing the global political economy. Princeton 
University Press: New Jersey. 
Watson, M., 2007. The Intellectual Conditions for Recent Increases in Capital Mobility. 
In The Political Economy of International Capital Mobility (pp. 63-90). Palgrave 
Macmillan, London. 
Weiss, L. ed., 2003. States in the global economy: Bringing domestic institutions back 
in (Vol. 86). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
White, G, and Wade, R., 1988. ‘The Developmental States and the Markets: An 
introduction’. In White, G. (ed.) Developmental State in East Asia: Macmillian: New 
York. pp.1-29. 
White, G., 1988. Developmental States in East Asia. Macmillian: New York. 
Woods, A., 2016. What is historical materialism? Available from: 
 https://www.marxist.com/an-introduction-to-historical-materialism.htm.Accessed 
12/09/2019. 
Word Bank., 2019. Private Capital flows. Available from: 
 https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/private-capital-flows-total-gdp-0.Accessed 
03/06/2019. 
World Bank., 1990. South Africa Overview. Available from 
 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview. Accessed 25/09/2019. 
World Bank., 2017. How Developing Countries Can Get the Most Out of Direct 
Investment. Available from: 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/competitiveness/publication/global-investment-
competitiveness-report. Accessed 04/10/2019. 
Zagha, R. and Nankani, G.T., 2005. Financial Liberalization: What Went Right, What 
Went Wrong. Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform. 
World Bank, pp.207-239. 
 
88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
